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Abstract: 
Reports an error in "Individual differences in the executive control of attention, memory, and 
thought, and their associations with schizotypy" by Michael J. Kane, Matt E. Meier, Bridget A. 
Smeekens, Georgina M. Gross, Charlotte A. Chun, Paul J. Silvia and Thomas R. Kwapil 
(Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2016[Aug], Vol 145[8], 1017-1048). There were 
errors in Table 3 and Table 7 (these transcription errors were limited to descriptive statistics in 
the Tables and did not affect any inferential statistics). In Table 3, the ARRO-TUT and LETT-
TUT variables had incorrect values for Mean [95% CI], SD, Skew, Kurtosis, and N. In Table 7, 
the same values (plus Min and Max) were incorrect for the SEM-SART variable. The correct 
values for these measures are presented in the correction (the values for Min and Max were 
correct as set in Table 3, but are repeated below for clarity). (The following abstract of the 
original article appeared in record 2016-29680-001.) A large correlational study took a latent-
variable approach to the generality of executive control by testing the individual-differences 
structure of executive-attention capabilities and assessing their prediction of schizotypy, a 
multidimensional construct (with negative, positive, disorganized, and paranoid factors) 
conveying risk for schizophrenia. Although schizophrenia is convincingly linked to executive 
deficits, the schizotypy literature is equivocal. Subjects completed tasks of working memory 
capacity (WMC), attention restraint (inhibiting prepotent responses), and attention constraint 
(focusing visual attention amid distractors), the latter 2 in an effort to fractionate the “inhibition” 
construct. We also assessed mind-wandering propensity (via in-task thought probes) and 
coefficient of variation in response times (RT CoV) from several tasks as more novel indices of 
executive attention. WMC, attention restraint, attention constraint, mind wandering, and RT CoV 
were correlated but separable constructs, indicating some distinctions among “attention control” 
abilities; WMC correlated more strongly with attentional restraint than constraint, and mind 
wandering correlated more strongly with attentional restraint, attentional constraint, and RT CoV 
than with WMC. Across structural models, no executive construct predicted negative schizotypy 
and only mind wandering and RT CoV consistently (but modestly) predicted positive, 
disorganized, and paranoid schizotypy; stalwart executive constructs in the schizophrenia 
literature—WMC and attention restraint—showed little to no predictive power, beyond 
restraint’s prediction of paranoia. Either executive deficits are consequences rather than risk 
factors for schizophrenia, or executive failures barely precede or precipitate diagnosable 
schizophrenia symptoms.  
Keyword: inhibition | schizotypy | executive attention | mind wandering | working memory 
capacity 
Article: 
People endeavor to regulate their mental processes—their attentional focus, their reactions to 
alluring distractions, their thought content—with varying success. That is, some people seem to 
have better cognitive control than others: showing minimal distraction from environmental 
events, persisting in goal-directed activities despite tempting diversions, and staying focused on 
tasks without their thoughts being derailed by personal concerns. One might wonder who these 
people are, and what makes them successful at self-control. However, we should first determine 
whether there truly is a class of “these people” to identify. That is, are adults who are less 
distractible also more successful at withholding impulsive comments? Does a person’s 
distractibility from environmental events also predict distractibility from their own thoughts? 
These questions are fundamentally about whether individual differences in cognitive, or 
“executive,” control are domain general and stable across different threats to control. 
Given that most intellectual abilities share individual-differences variance (e.g., Carroll, 
1993; Gustafsson, 1984; Horn, 1968), we expect some generality of control capabilities. Indeed, 
empirical research by Miyake, Friedman, and colleagues (e.g., Friedman et al., 
2008, 2011; Miyake et al., 2000; see Miyake & Friedman, 2012, for a review) suggests both 
domain generality (“unity”) and domain specificity (“diversity”) of executive control. 
Confirmatory factor analyses of task batteries including response inhibition, memory updating, 
and task-set switching measures indicate that these three executive factors are distinguishable. 
That is, one’s response inhibition capabilities are not identical to one’s memory-updating or task-
switching capabilities. At the same time, the three factors correlate substantially (≈.40–.60), 
indicating some domain generality. It therefore seems that there is a group of “these people,” 
who are effective cognitive regulators across domains. 
At the same time, purely cognitive approaches to executive individual differences fail to capture 
all the ways in which control abilities, and control failures, may manifest in both laboratory and 
everyday settings (e.g., Altamirano, Miyake, & Whitmer, 2010; Unsworth et al., 2009; Young et 
al., 2009). To expand the field’s consideration of executive-control variation, the present study 
assesses its association with a personality construct—schizotypy—that has been linked to control 
deficits (e.g., Gooding, 1999; Kerns, 2006; Tallent & Gooding, 1999). Schizotypy refers to a 
spectrum of unusual experiential, emotional, behavioral, and interpersonal traits, with psychosis 
and schizophrenia at its extreme (e.g., Meehl, 1990). Our present goal, then, is to explore the 
individual-differences structure of executive control—focusing on fractionating the response 
inhibition construct and exploring additional executive attention factors, such as working 
memory capacity, mind-wandering propensity, and RT variability—and testing their associations 
to a personality construct (schizotypy) that is associated with executive-control deficits and with 
strange subjective experiences suggesting attentional differences. 
Executive Attention and Schizotypy 
Etiological models of schizophrenia (Andreasen, 1999; Gottesman, 1991; Meehl, 1990) assume 
that an interaction of genetic, neurodevelopmental, and psychosocial factors underlie 
vulnerability for schizophrenia and spectrum disorders, which is expressed across a continuum 
known as “schizotypy.” Most people high in schizotypy will not decompensate into 
schizophrenia, but many will experience attenuated or transient symptoms, ranging from 
subclinical deviance, to spectrum personality disorders, to psychosis (e.g., Kwapil, Barrantes-
Vidal, & Silvia, 2008). Schizotypy is a multidimensional construct comprising latent factors that 
mirror those of schizophrenia: negative, positive, disorganized, and paranoid (e.g., Arndt, 
Alliger, & Andreasen, 1991; Bilder, Mukherjee, Rieder, & Pandurangi, 1985; Horton, Barrantes-
Vidal, Silvia, & Kwapil, 2014; Liddle, 1987). Negative schizotypy involves functional and 
experiential deficits, such as social withdrawal, avolition, anhedonia, and diminished affect, 
whereas positive schizotypy involves experiential excesses, such as unusual beliefs (magical and 
referential thinking; delusions) and perceptual experiences (illusions; hallucinations). Like 
positive schizotypy, and also reflecting prototypical features of psychosis, both paranoid and 
disorganized schizotypy exhibit abundant but abnormal thought: Paranoid schizotypy features 
suspiciousness and expectation of mistreatment or persecution, whereas disorganized schizotypy 
reflects confused, disordered speech, thought, and behavior. 
Questionnaire measures, such as the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ; Raine, 1991) 
and the Wisconsin Schizotypy scales (WSS; e.g., Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 
1976, 1978; Eckblad & Chapman, 1983), validly assess schizotypic traits (Kwapil & Chun, 
2015). Psychometrically assessed schizotypy is associated with psychotic-like, prodromal, 
schizophrenia-spectrum, and subjective cognitive symptoms (e.g., Barrantes-Vidal, Chun, Myin-
Germeys, & Kwapil, 2013; Blanchard, Collins, Aghevli, Leung, & Cohen, 2011; Kwapil et al., 
2008; Yon, Loas, & Monestès, 2009). Longitudinally, positive schizotypy predicts development 
of psychotic disorders and negative schizotypy predicts schizophrenia-spectrum disorders 
(Chapman et al., 1994; Gooding, Tallent, & Matts, 2005; Kwapil, 1998; Kwapil, Gross, Silvia, & 
Barrantes-Vidal, 2013). Cross-sectionally, schizotypy predicts schizophrenic-like patterns of 
neuro- and social–cognitive impairment, neurological soft signs, and neuroimaging signatures 
(e.g., Coleman, Levy, Lenzenweger, & Holzman, 1996; Fuggetta, Bennett, Duke, & Young, 
2014; Gooding, Matts, & Rollmann, 2006; Kaczorowski, Barrantes-Vidal, & Kwapil, 
2009; Modinos et al., 2010). Daily life experience sampling further indicates that positive 
schizotypy predicts momentary psychotic-like symptoms, negative affect, suspiciousness, and 
stress-reactivity, whereas negative schizotypy predicts decreased positive affect and social 
interest, and diminished thoughts and emotions (e.g., Kwapil et al., 2009, 2012; Barrantes-Vidal 
et al., 2013). 
Considerable research has explored cognitive and, specifically, executive-control correlates of 
schizophrenia (see Barch, 2005; Barch & Ceaser, 2012; Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 1998; Park & 
Gooding, 2014). Studying schizotypy in currently healthy adults, however, has advantages 
regarding questions about risk versus resilience for psychopathology. From a cognitive 
perspective, a further advantage is that mental processes associated with schizotypy can be 
studied unconfounded by the severe behavioral, social, and medical consequences of 
schizophrenia, which may obfuscate disease-specific effects. Indeed, even in first-episode, 
medication-naïve schizophrenia patients, who are free of such chronic influences (e.g., Barch et 
al., 2001, 2003), acute symptoms in the moment may impair motivation or ability to perform 
cognitive tasks. Any observed executive deficits in schizophrenia are thus ambiguous regarding 
cognitive versus motivational influences and whether cognitive deficits confer liability for, or 
follow from, the disorder. 
Unfortunately, only a small literature has addressed the association between schizotypy and 
executive control. This limited work, moreover, presents mixed findings that are difficult to 
reconcile. Different studies use different schizotypy measures—some average across multiple 
schizotypy factors and others on a particular dimension (e.g., social anhedonia). Some studies 
assess schizotypy continuously and others dichotomize schizotypy and control groups arbitrarily. 
Some studies test university students, others draw from the broader community, and most do so 
with underpowered samples. Most studies also use only a single instrument to assess schizotypy, 
but even those that use multiple measures tend not to combine them using latent-variable 
techniques. Similarly, they assess particular cognitive constructs with widely different tasks and 
almost always with only a single, multiply determined task per construct (and when multiple 
tasks are used, they are usually treated individually). 
Schizotypy and Working Memory Capacity 
Schizotypy studies typically measure working memory capacity (WMC), the ability to maintain 
information in the service of ongoing activities, with digit- or letter-number span tests, n-back 
tasks, or delayed match-to-sample tasks. The findings are incoherent. Matheson and Langdon 
(2008) found that some schizotypy factors, but not others, correlated modestly with letter-
number span, but most studies have found no differences between higher and lower schizotypy 
subjects in letter-number, digit, or other span tasks (Avons, Nunn, Chan, & Armstrong, 
2003; Chan, Wang, et al., 2011; Chun, Minor, & Cohen, 2013; Daly, Afroz, & Walder, 
2012; Iati, 2012; Lenzenweger & Gold, 2000; M. Peters, Smeets, Giesbrecht, Jelici, & 
Merckelbach, 2007; Tervo, 2004; Unsworth et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2008). Regarding n-back 
and delayed-match-to-sample studies, they are each about evenly split between those finding null 
schizotypy effects (Chan, Wang et al., 2011; Smyrnis et al., 2007; Park & McTigue, 1997; 
N. Smith & Lenzenweger, 2013; Wang et al., 2008) and those that show limited and inconsistent 
schizotypy effects, with schizotypy-related differences arising in some dependent measures but 
not others, or for some schizotypy dimensions but not others (Gooding & Tallent, 2003; Kerns & 
Becker, 2008; Koychev, El-Deredy, Haenschel, & Deakin, 2010; Koychev et al., 2012; Park, 
Holzman & Lenzenweger, 1995; Schmidt-Hansen & Honey, 2009; Tallent & Gooding, 1999). 
On balance, there may be some limited signal amid this noise, but unlike the schizophrenia 
literature, it is not clear whether all or any schizotypy dimensions are associated with WMC 
impairment. 
Schizotypy and Executive Attention 
In terms of other, relevant executive dimensions, enough studies have assessed the relation of 
schizotypy to sustained attention and inhibitory control to review here. Sustained attention has 
been most frequently measured with the continuous performance identical-pairs test (CPT-IP); 
subjects respond only when two consecutive stimuli (e.g., 4-digit numbers) in a sequence are 
identical. Several studies found either a negative correlation between schizotypy scores and 
CPT-IP accuracy (Bergida & Lenzenweger, 2006; Chen, Hsiao, & Lin, 1997; Rawlings & 
Goldberg, 2001) or a mean deficit in CPT-IP for high compared to low schizotypy groups 
(Gooding et al., 2006; Lenzenweger, 2001; Lenzenweger, Cornblatt, & Putnick, 1991; Obiols, 
García-Domingo, de Trinchería, & Doménech, 1993). Many of these effects were small, 
however, and either relied on 1-tailed tests, or arose only in some outcome measures, or arose 
inconsistently for some schizotypy dimensions but not others. Moreover, other CPT-IP studies 
have found only null effects of schizotypy (Smyrnis et al., 2007; Tervo, 2004), as have studies 
using different sustained attention measures, the Sustained Attention to Response Task 
(SART; Chan, Wang, et al., 2011; Chan, Yan, et al., 2011), and the COGLAB sustained attention 
test (Otteson, 1995; Spaulding, Garbin, & Dras, 1989). 
Inhibition-control results are also mixed. The SART, mentioned with the null studies above, is a 
go/no-go task that demands response inhibition in addition to sustained attention. The venerable 
Stroop task also yields primarily null results: most studies find no deficits associated with 
schizotypy (Beech, Baylis, Smithson, & Claridge, 1989; Cimino & Haywood, 2008; Dinn, 
Harris, Aycicegi, Greene, & Andover, 2002; Höfer, Della Casa, & Feldon, 1999; Kerns, 
2006; Lipp, Siddle, & Arnold, 1994; Martin & Kerns, 2010; E. Peters, Pickering, & Hemsley, 
1994; Steel, Hemsley, & Jones, 1996). Only three studies have reported significant Stroop 
results, but inconsistently across different schizotypy dimensions (Moritz et al., 1999; Suhr, 
1997; Swerdlow, Filion, Geyer, & Braff, 1995). Finally, regarding inhibition, two other measures 
show limited sensitivity to schizotypy. In the antisaccade task and the Preparation for 
Overcoming a Prepotent Response task, which require subjects to respond in opposition to strong 
visual cues, people who are high in some schizotypy dimensions (or in some measures), but not 
in others, show worse performance (Gooding, 1999; Kerns, 2006; O’Driscoll, Lenzenweger, & 
Holzman, 1998; Unsworth et al., 2009). 
In short, our review indicates that the schizotypy literature—which features many studies lacking 
in statistical power, in optimal construct measurement, or both—currently lacks clear evidence 
that either WMC, sustained attention, or inhibitory control are deficient in people who are high 
in schizotypy. A more comprehensive and sophisticated approach to measuring schizotypy and 
executive control abilities, at the level of constructs, is needed to make significant theoretical 
progress. 
The Structure of WMC and Executive Attention 
 
Individual-differences research on executive attention has two historical roots. One, currently 
focused on the constructs of inhibition, memory updating, and switching, grew from questions 
regarding neuropsychological tests of ostensible frontal-lobe functions and whether these 
“executive functions” were unitary or distinguishable (see Miyake & Friedman, 2012). The other 
arose from testing theoretical claims about working memory’s “central executive” component 
(Baddeley, 1986) and the generality of its predictive power. That is, individual differences in 
WMC clearly predicted important and diverse intellectual abilities (e.g., Daneman & Carpenter, 
1980; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Shute, 1991) and 
a candidate mechanism was a domain-general set of “executive attention” capabilities. Engle and 
colleagues tested this idea and discovered that attention-demanding components of memory 
retrieval, such as controlling interference, discriminated higher- from lower-WMC adults 
(e.g., Conway & Engle, 1994; Rosen & Engle, 1997, 1998). Moreover, relatively “simple” 
attention tasks also varied with WMC (e.g., Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001; Kane, Bleckley, 
Conway, & Engle, 2001; Kane & Engle, 2003). Such findings suggested that variation in 
domain-general attention-control processes contributed to WMC variation and its covariation 
with complex cognition (e.g., Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007; Hasher, Lustig, & Zacks, 
2007; Kane, Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 2007). 
More recent, large-scale studies of WMC and attention control have assumed that a variety of 
tasks tap into a single “executive attention” factor, whether they require focusing on a target 
stimulus amid distractors, overriding a prepotent response to a stimulus, or sustaining optimal 
response readiness over long tasks. Most of these studies mix 2 to 4 such tasks and take their 
shared variance to reflect a latent executive construct via structural equation modeling. These 
models fit the data, indicating generality, but these studies have not used enough tasks of each 
type to test for dissociable forms of control. What these studies do show clearly is that WMC and 
executive attention are strongly linked, with latent-variable correlations in the .50 to .70 range 
(reported correlations in brackets: Chuderski, 2014 [.61]; Chuderski, Taraday, Nęcka, & Smoleń, 
2012 [.63, Study 1; .60, Study 2]; Colom, Abad, Quiroga, Shih, & Flores-Mendoza, 
2008 [.52]; Dang, Braeken, Colom, Ferrer, & Liu, 2014 [.61 with spatial WMC; .45 with verbal 
WMC]; McVay & Kane, 2012b [.73]; Schweizer & Moosbrugger, 2004 [.50]; Shipstead, 
Harrison, & Engle, 2015 [.74, data set 2]; Shipstead, Lindsey, Marshall, & Engle, 
2014 [.68]; Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2012 [.64]; Unsworth, Fukuda, Awh, & Vogel, 
2014 [.54]; Unsworth & Spillers, 2010 [.58]; Unsworth, Spillers, & Brewer, 2009 [.41]; but for 
outlying null correlations, see Keye, Wilhelm, Oberauer, & van Ravenzwaaij, 2009 [.07 and .16] 
and Keye, Wilhelm, Oberauer, & Stürmer, 2013 [.06]). We therefore argue that WMC and 
attention-control abilities share 25–50% of their variance. 
These strong WMC-attention correlations suggest generality, but two large-scale studies have 
attempted to fractionate the executive-attention construct further. Chuderski et al. (2012, Study 
1) tested whether goal-maintenance, response-competition, and response inhibition abilities 
showed unity and diversity, and whether they correlated with WMC. The attention constructs did 
not correlate with each other and they differentially correlated with WMC, both indicating 
diversity of executive attention. Unfortunately, the study tested poorly operationalized constructs 
and used too few tasks and subjects. Friedman and Miyake (2004) asked a more tractable 
question: whether response inhibition tasks (overriding dominant responses; e.g., stop-signal and 
Stroop tasks) tap the same construct as distractor interference tasks (ignoring distractor stimuli; 
e.g., flanker tasks). Their structural model indicated a strong (.68) correlation between response 
inhibition and distractor-interference factors. In fact, a single “inhibition-distraction” factor fit 
the data, indicating that response and distractor control were strongly related, if not isomorphic. 
We have more confidence in Friedman and Miyake’s conclusions—that executive attention 
constructs are reasonably well correlated—given their study’s larger sample, their more adequate 
task battery, and their nonzero correlations among attention tasks matching those from other 
studies (e.g., Chuderski, 2014; McVay & Kane, 2012b; Shipstead et al., 2014; Unsworth & 
Spillers, 2010). 
At the same time, with only two contradictory studies, we must withhold strong judgment about 
the unity versus diversity of executive attention. This is unfortunate because important 
theoretical questions can hinge on whether particular tasks are good indicators of a general 
executive construct. For example, Paap and Greenberg’s (2013; see also Paap, Johnson, & Sawi, 
2014; Paap & Sawi, 2014) arguments against a bilingual advantage in executive control are 
based in part on weak correlations among different putative inhibition tasks (antisaccade, flanker, 
and Simon tasks): If bilingual advantages are seen on one or another of these tasks, but the tasks 
do not correlate, then the evidence cannot support a task- or domain-general bilingual benefit. 
Similarly, executive-attention theories of WMC may be considered either falsified or specified in 
light of null WMC effects in particular attention tasks, such as Simon, visual search, or task 
switching (e.g., Draheim, Hicks, & Engle, 2016; Keye et al., 2009; Meier & Kane, 
2015; Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & Wittman, 2003; Poole & Kane, 2009). To advance our 
understanding of executive attention constructs, the present study rigorously tests the generality 
versus specificity of response inhibition and distractor interference constructs, with a large 
participant and task sample (we use the labels attention restraint and attention constraint, 
respectively, as neutral descriptions for these tasks’ demands). 
Mind Wandering Propensity as Another Marker of Executive Attention 
People’s thoughts often drift from their ongoing task and immediate environment, a phenomenon 
described as “daydreaming,” “mind wandering,” or “task-unrelated thought” (TUT; 
e.g., Giambra, 1989; Klinger, 1999; Singer, 1966; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Scientific 
studies typically assess TUTs by interrupting subjects’ ongoing tasks with unpredictable thought 
probes that ask them whether their immediately preceding thoughts were on-task or off-task. To 
the extent that someone intends to stay task-focused, a TUT experience may reflect executive-
control failure, much like distraction by irrelevant environmental stimuli (McVay & Kane, 
2010). Mind wandering isn’t always unintentional or problematic, however, and so executive 
processes cannot completely account for individual differences in TUTs (e.g., Seli, Cheyne, Xu, 
Purdon, & Smilek, 2015). Indeed, a theoretical consensus is emerging that executive control does 
not simply prevent mind wandering by actively maintaining task-oriented cognition: Executive 
processes may also support mind wandering by maintaining internally focused cognition when 
situations allow it (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Smallwood, 
2013; Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013; see also Thomson, Besner, & Smilek, 2015); they 
may also dynamically shift focus between on- and off-task thought based on task demands 
(Rummel & Boywitt, 2014). 
The current study presented demanding contexts where TUTs impair performance and thus better 
(but imperfectly) indicate control failures. Our primary question was whether executive-control 
variation, such as in WMC, attention restraint, and constraint, would predict TUT rates, with 
people of higher control reporting fewer TUTs. We further asked whether executive 
constructs differentially predicted mind-wandering. Limited evidence suggests that attention 
restraint correlates more strongly with TUT rates than does WMC (McVay & Kane, 
2012b; Unsworth & McMillan, 2014) and that constraint abilities do not correlate at all with 
questionnaire measures of daydreaming, which contradicts executive-attention accounts of TUT 
vulnerability (Forster & Lavie, 2014). Should researchers continue to use WMC tasks to explore 
executive contributions to mind wandering? Are constraint abilities uniquely independent of 
TUTs? 
WMC correlates negatively with TUTs during demanding tasks (for reviews, see Kane & 
McVay, 2012; Randall, Oswald, & Beier, 2014). In a week-long, daily life study, Kane, Brown, 
et al. (2007) provided WMC-screened subjects with a digital device that probed their thoughts 
and asked about their context. Lower WMC subjects reported more TUTs than did higher WMC 
subjects only during activities they rated as requiring more concentration and as more 
challenging and effortful. In lab tasks that assess attention restraint (McVay & Kane, 
2009, 2012a), memory updating (Rummel & Boywitt, 2014), or reading (McVay & Kane, 
2012b; Unsworth & McMillan, 2013), WMC also negatively predicts TUTs. But in relatively 
easy but tedious tasks, such as vigilance (McVay & Kane, 2012a), WMC is uncorrelated with 
TUTs; indeed, trivially demanding tasks may even elicit more mind wandering in higher than in 
lower WMC subjects (Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014). 
The WMC-TUT association is thus moderated by task demands and is only modest, even in 
demanding contexts. Most studies have found correlations between individual WMC and TUT 
measures in the −.10 to −.20 range (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2009; Rummel & Boywitt, 
2014; Unsworth & McMillan, 2014) and between WMC and TUT latent variables in the −.20 to 
−.30 range (McVay & Kane, 2012a, 2012b; Unsworth & McMillan, 2013, 2014). Along with 
reported null associations (e.g., Krawietz, Tamplin, & Radvansky, 2012; Smeekens & Kane, in 
press), the meta-analytic estimate for the correlation between broad cognitive ability measures 
(including WMC) and laboratory TUT rates is weak, at only ρ = −.14 [−.09 – −.19] (Randall et 
al., 2014). The field has reported far fewer tests of TUTs’ association with attention-control or 
restraint measures, but two latent variable studies indicate correlations in the range of .40–.50 
(McVay & Kane, 2012b; Unsworth & McMillan, 2014). If such findings are replicable, it would 
suggest that researchers interested in mind-wandering variation would be best served examining 
cognitive-ability influences with lower-level attention tasks rather than WMC tasks. 
Response Time Variability as Another Marker of Executive Attention 
 
People with good cognitive control should show stable performance within a task despite 
distractions. Indeed, the “worst performance rule” (Larson & Alderton, 1990) describes that 
people of higher and lower intelligence do not differ much in their best performance on tasks 
(e.g., in their shortest RTs in attention tasks) but they differ greatly in their worst performance 
(e.g., in their longest RTs; for a review, see Coyle, 2003). Lower WMC subjects similarly 
produce more very-slow responses than do higher WMC subjects, so their RT distributions are 
more positively skewed and yield a larger τ parameter in formal ex-Gaussian models 
(e.g., Schmiedek, Oberauer, Wilhelm, Süß, & Wittmann, 2007; Unsworth, Redick, Lakey, & 
Young, 2010; Unsworth, Redick, Spillers, & Brewer, 2012). TUT rates during challenging tasks, 
another marker of executive control, also predict RT variability (Bastian & Sackur, 2013; Seli, 
Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013) and partially mediate WMC’s association with RT variability (McVay 
& Kane, 2009, 2012b). 
Unsworth (2015) reanalyzed three studies to explore RT variability’s association to other 
executive-attention indices. All three assessed coefficient of variation (CoV; i.e., SD/M) in RT in 
multiple attention tasks (e.g., Stroop, flanker); two also measured CoV from lexical-decision 
tasks. CoV from attention and lexical-decision tasks correlated modestly, and models separating 
these constructs fit better. Moreover, CoV from only the attention tasks correlated with WMC, 
TUT rates, and other measures. CoV in attention-control tasks may thus be a novel, useful 
indicator of executive capabilities. We did not design the present study to explore CoV’s 
nomological net, but we addressed a question about CoV assessment. Unsworth calculated CoV 
from tasks that either required executive control on all trials (antisaccade, psychomotor 
vigilance) or included both control-demanding and nondemanding trials (Stroop, flanker); for the 
latter, CoV was calculated across both trial types. CoV measures may thus have been 
confounded with the basic experimental effect—and executive ability—of interest. That is, 
someone who is very slow on Stroop incongruent trials versus congruent trials will not only 
show a larger Stroop effect, but also more variability across both trial types. We reasoned that, in 
tasks where subjects attempt to bring attention control to bear, good control should be evident 
not only on trials eliciting conflict, but also on nonconflict trials (cf., McVay & Kane, 
2009, 2012a). We therefore took a more conservative approach to the question of how RT 
variability relates to other executive-control constructs by measuring CoV from only nonconflict 
trials. 
Goals and Hypotheses 
Schizophrenia is convincingly linked to executive-control deficits, but psychometrically assessed 
schizotypy is not. If some schizotypy dimensions have cognitive correlates, the field must more 
rigorously assess both schizotypy and executive control to confirm this. In addition to measuring 
mind wandering, which has barely been considered in light of schizophrenia’s positive 
symptoms (D. Shin et al., 2015), the present study measures multiple factors of executive control 
and schizotypy, with multiple indicators each, and uses latent-variable analyses to assess their 
associations in a large sample. Our theoretical questions concern the associations among 
executive constructs—WMC, attention restraint, attention constraint, mind wandering, and 
intraindividual variability—and their associations to dimensions of schizotypy. 
We predicted that attention restraint and constraint would be distinguishable but correlated, that 
CoV would reflect a distinct but correlated factor of executive control, and that our attention 
constructs would more strongly predict TUT rate than would WMC. Also, TUTs should predict 
schizotypy dimensions associated with cognitive and experiential excess—positive, 
disorganized, and paranoid—but not negative schizotypy, which is characterized by a paucity of 
inner experience. Although the schizophrenia literature suggests executive deficits, our review of 
the schizotypy literature left open whether WMC, attention restraint, constraint, or CoV should 
predict particular (or any) schizotypy dimensions. 
Method 
Across Method and Results sections, we report how we determined our sample size and all data 
exclusions, manipulations, and measures in the study (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). 
Subjects 
Our data-collection stopping rule was to test subjects for 4 to 5 complete semesters, until we had 
at least 400 subjects with 3 sessions of laboratory data and at least 200 of these subjects with 
usable data from a subsequent daily life experience sampling study (not reported here). Subjects 
could sign up for that daily life study after completing the second or third laboratory session. 
We recruited some subjects from “mass screening” sessions each semester to allow oversampling 
of high schizotypy. Subjects completed short forms (Winterstein et al., 2011) of the WSS used in 
this study: Magical Ideation (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983), Perceptual Aberration (Chapman, 
Chapman, & Raulin, 1978), Physical Anhedonia (Chapman et al., 1976), and Revised Social 
Anhedonia (Eckblad, Chapman, Chapman, & Mishlove, 1982) Scales. The short forms yield two 
factors, positive and negative schizotypy, accounting for 75% of their variance (Gross, Silvia, 
Barrantes-Vidal, & Kwapil, 2012). Based on short-form scores, all mass screening subjects 
earned a positive and negative score, based on factor loadings from 6,137 prior students. Mass 
screening subjects were not required to complete the present study, but we sent email invitations 
to anyone scoring at least 1.5 SD above the positive or negative schizotypy dimension mean. 
Participation in the study was open to students regardless of whether they completed mass 
screening. 
Five hundred forty-five undergraduates, aged 18 to 35, provided informed consent to begin the 
study between January 2012 and April 2014. All were students at the University of North 
Carolina at Greensboro, a comprehensive and Minority-Serving state university (M first-year 
student SAT scores = 1032 to 1041 for cohorts entering Fall 2011 through Fall 2013; 27% 
African American undergraduates in Fall, 2015), who participated as partial fulfillment of an 
introductory course requirement. Of the 545 subjects who completed the first session, 492 
completed two sessions, and 472 completed all three. 
Apparatus and Materials 
We programmed all measures in E-Prime 1.2 or 2.0. Dell (Windows XP) computers with 
QWERTY keyboards presented all stimuli on 17“ CRT monitors (a few individual-subject 
sessions used LCD monitors). 
Measures 
We provide more detailed descriptions of some of the measures below in supplemental materials. 
Schizotypy questionnaires 
All subjects completed a battery of questionnaires (including three exploratory measures not 
analyzed here), regardless of whether they had completed short forms of some of these measures 
in mass screening sessions. Computer administration of the schizotypy questionnaires was split 
between the first two sessions, each with items from different scales mixed with one another. 
Wisconsin Schizotypy Scales (WSS) 
The WSS, including the Perceptual Aberration (PERCABER), Magical Ideation (MAGCIDEA), 
Physical Anhedonia (PHY-ANHD), and Revised Social Anhedonia (SOC-ANHD) Scales, were 
administered in the first session. The WSS contain 166 true-false items that were intermixed with 
a 13-item infrequency scale (Chapman & Chapman, 1983) to rule out invalid protocols (e.g., “I 
find that I often walk with a limp, which is the result of a skydiving accident”; “I believe that 
most light bulbs are powered by electricity”); the WSS administration also included one of the 
unanalyzed exploratory measures mentioned above. Subjects saw one item at a time on-screen, 
and responded by mouse-clicking either the “True” or “False” box below each item. The WSS 
scales have good internal consistency in college student samples, with coefficient alphas of .84 to 
.88 in 6,137 participants (Gross, Silvia, Barrantes-Vidal, & Kwapil, 2012). Confirmatory factor 
analytic studies support that positive and negative schizotypy factors underlie the WSS measures 
(e.g., Kwapil et al., 2008), with positive reflecting primarily Perceptual Aberration and Magical 
Ideation measures and negative reflecting primarily Physical Anhendonia and Social Anhedonia 
scales. Moreover, these two factors predict different patterns of symptoms and impairment in 
cross-sectional (e.g., Barrantes-Vidal et al., 2013) and longitudinal (e.g., Kwapil et al., 2013) 
studies. The remaining schizotypy questionnaires were administered in the second session, all 
intermixed and including six infrequency items (see Chapman & Chapman, 1983), two of the 
unanalyzed questionnaires, and, in order to reduce the overall level of deviance implied by the 
questions in the second session, 9 extraversion and 9 agreeableness items from the Hexaco 
Personality Inventory–Revised (Lee & Ashton, 2004). 
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) subscales and additional schizotypy measures 
The odd speech (ODSPEECH) and odd behavior (ODBEHAVR) subscales assessed 
disorganization, the referential thinking (REFTHINK) subscale assessed positive schizotypy, and 
the suspiciousness (SUSPICIO) subscale assessed paranoia. The SPQ is widely used in college 
samples and the subscales have adequate reliability (Raine, 1991). Although administered, we 
did not analyze the “no close friends” or “constricted affect” subscales because they may better 
tap neuroticism than negative schizotypy (Gross, Mellin, Silvia, Barrantes-Vidal, & Kwapil, 
2014). Participants completed the Paranoia Checklist (PARACHEK; Freeman et al., 2005), an 
18-item scale measuring a range of clinical and nonclinical paranoia that correlates with other 
paranoia measures and has good internal consistency (Horton et al., 2014). The 34-item 
Cognitive Slippage Scale (COGSLIPG; Miers & Raulin, 1987) taps disruptions in thought and 
speech, and thus disorganization. The scale is associated with other questionnaire measures of 
schizotypy and has good internal consistency in college samples (Gooding, Tallent, & Hegyi, 
2001). Six items from the Cognitive Dysregulation subscale of the Dimensional Assessment of 
Personality Pathology–Basic Questionnaire (COGDYSRG; Livesley & Jackson, 2009) assessed 
thought disturbance characteristic of disorganization. 
WMC tasks 
We measured WMC with six tasks that required maintaining target items in the face of additional 
processing. Of these, four automated “complex span” tasks (operation, reading, symmetry, and 
rotation span) required subjects to memorize short sequences of either verbal-numerical or 
visuospatial items (Redick et al., 2012; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005; Unsworth, 
Redick, Heitz, Broadway, & Engle, 2009). Each item appeared after an unrelated processing task 
that required a true-false decision under a response deadline, made by mouse-clicking a YES or 
NO box on-screen. At the end of each trial sequence of unpredictable length, subjects recalled 
the memory items in order by using the mouse to select them from the complete pool of 12–16 
possible items. Subjects began each complex span task with practice: (a) memorizing small sets 
(with no processing task); (b) the processing task alone; (c) then both subtasks combined. 
Processing-only practice trials recorded decision RTs; during the real task, if any processing-task 
decision was not made within 2.5 standard deviations of the processing-only practice RT mean, 
the program skipped the subsequent memory stimulus and the trial was counted as a processing 
error. 
Operation Span (OPERSPAN) 
Subjects memorized sequences of 3 to 7 capital letters, each presented in alternation with a 
compound arithmetic equation to verify [for example, (3 × 2) – 1 = 4; half were true], and 
randomly selected without replacement from a set of 12. At recall, all 12 letters appeared in a 
grid. Subjects selected each letter from the most recent memory set in its serial position by 
clicking on its corresponding check box. Each set length of 3 to 7 occurred three times in a 
random order generated for each subject. The dependent measure was the total number of letters 
recalled in correct serial position (of 75). 
Reading Span (READSPAN) 
Subjects memorized sequences of two to six four-letter words, each presented in alternation with 
a sentence to verify as either sensible or nonsensical (e.g., “During winter you can get a room at 
the beach for a very low rate”; half were sensible), and randomly selected without replacement 
from a set of 15. The recall phase was identical to operation span, but with 15 words presented in 
a grid. Each set length of 2 to 6 occurred three times in a random order generated for each 
subject. The dependent measure was the total number of words recalled in correct serial position 
(of 60). 
Symmetry Span (SYMMSPAN) 
Subjects memorized sequences of 2 to 5 red squares appearing within a 4 × 4 matrix. Each red 
square appeared in alternation with a black-and-white pattern made from an 8 × 8 grid to verify 
as either symmetrical or asymmetrical along its vertical axis (half were symmetrical), and 
randomly selected without replacement from the 16 possible squares in the matrix. For the recall 
phase, subjects saw an empty 4 × 4 matrix and mouse-clicked the red square locations in serial 
order. Each set length of 2 to 5 occurred three times in a random order generated for each 
subject. The dependent measure was the total number of red-square locations recalled in correct 
serial position (of 42). 
Rotation Span (ROTASPAN) 
Subjects memorized sequences of 2 to 5 large and small arrows, radiating from the center of the 
screen in one of 8 directions. Each arrow appeared in alternation with a rotated capitalized letter 
(F, G, J, R) to verify as either normal or mirror-reversed (half were normal), and randomly 
selected without replacement from 16 possible size-orientation arrow combinations. For the 
recall phase, subjects saw a centered array of 8 small and 8 large arrows, and clicked on the 
arrowheads in serial order. Each set length of 2 to 5 occurred three times in a random order 
generated for each subject. The dependent measure was the total number of arrows recalled in 
correct serial position (of 42). 
Running Span (RUNNSPAN) 
This task (see Broadway & Engle, 2010) did not present a secondary processing task. Instead, 
each trial presented a sequence of to-be-memorized letters (drawn without replacement from a 
set of 12) and only the final 3 to 7 letters were to be recalled. Each trial began with a digit to 
indicate the set size, or the number of letters to remember from the end of the list. For each set 
size, the entire trial length was unpredictably 2, 1, or 0 items longer than set size (one trial of 
each length for each set size, for 15 trials). Set sizes were blocked, with block order randomized 
for each subject. At recall, all 12 letters appeared in a grid, along with the set size. Subjects 
selected each letter from the memory set in its serial position by clicking on its check box The 
dependent measure was the total number of letters recalled in their correct serial position (of 75). 
Updating Counters (COUNTERS) 
Subjects recalled the numerical values of boxes, some of which updated their original values 
(see Lewandowsky, Oberauer, Yang, & Ecker, 2010). Each trial presented 3 to 5 boxes 
horizontally, and consisted of 3 phases: learning, updating, recall. At learning, a digit (1–9) 
appeared in each box in random order. During updating, 2 to 6 box values were changed by 
presenting a digit with a plus or minus sign (e.g., +2; −5); each update ranged from −7 to + 7. 
During updating, some boxes might change multiple times while others not at all. Subjects 
retained only the current value for each box, which always ranged from 1 to 9. At recall, each 
box outline turned red (in random order) to prompt the subject to enter its final value. Each set 
size of 3 to 5 boxes was crossed with number of updates (2–6) to generate 15 trials. The 
dependent measure was the proportion of 60 final box values recalled correctly. 
Attention restraint tasks 
Attention restraint tasks required subjects to override a prepotent response with a novel, goal-
directed one. We used five tasks to represent this construct. 
Antisaccade Letters (ANTI-LET) 
Subjects identified a letter on one side of the screen that was cued by a flash on the opposite side 
(see Kane et al., 2001). Each of 90 trials first presented a central-fixation array of three asterisks 
for 200–1800 ms, followed by a flashing cue (“=”) 8.6 cm to the left or right of fixation, 
followed by a to-be-identified target letter (B, P, or R) in the opposite screen location from the 
cue (8.6 cm from fixation). The target letter was pattern-masked after 100 ms. Subjects 
responded via keys on the number keypad labeled B, P, and R. The dependent measure was 
proportion of errors on 90 test trials. 
Antisaccade Arrows (ANTI-ARO) 
Subjects identified an arrow on one side of the screen that was cued by a flash on the opposite 
side (see McVay & Kane, 2012b). Each of 72 trials first presented a central-fixation array for 
250–2250 ms, followed by a flashing cue (“=”) 11.4 cm to the left or right of fixation, followed 
by a to-be-identified arrow (pointing up, down, left, or right) in the opposite screen location from 
the cue (11.4 cm from fixation). Subjects responded with the 2, 4, 8, and 6 keys on the number 
keypad for down, left, up, and right arrows, respectively. The dependent measure was the 
proportion of errors on 72 test trials. (During the first semester of data collection, we presented 
cues and targets for longer durations than in the final task; error scores were positively skewed 
and clustered near floor, and so we adjusted the task for all remaining subjects and retained task 
data from only these latter subjects.) 
Semantic Sustained Attention To Response Task (SEM-SART) 
This go/no-go task required subjects to press the space bar for words from one category 
(animals; 89% of trials) while withholding response to another (vegetables; 11% of trials; 
see McVay & Kane, 2012b). Each of 675 trials presented a word for 300 ms, then a mask for 
1500 ms. Trials were divided into five seamless blocks, each comprising 3 miniblocks of 45 
trials that presented 40 unique animal names and 5 unique vegetable names. The dependent 
measures were d′ (i.e., hit rate to animals minus false alarm rate to vegetables) and SDof RTs to 
“go” (animals) trials. 
Number Stroop (N-STROOP) 
Subjects reported the number of digits presented on each trial while ignoring the identity of the 
digits (see McVay & Kane, 2012b). Each trial presented a row of 2 to 4 digits and subjects 
pressed one of three labeled keys to indicate the number of digits on-screen. The 300 test trials 
were divided into two seamless blocks of 150 trials; 80% of trials were congruent and presented 
matching digits and counts (e.g., 4444) and 20% were incongruent and presented mismatching 
stimuli (e.g., 2222). Dependent measures were RTs and error rates for congruent and incongruent 
trials from the first test block only (the second block was used to independently assess mind 
wandering, as described below). 
Spatial Stroop (S-STROOP) 
Subjects reported the relative position of a word to an asterisk, with the word and asterisk both 
presented to the left or right, or above or below, fixation; subjects ignored both the identity of the 
word (“LEFT,” “RIGHT,” “ABOVE,” “BELOW”) and the absolute location of the word and 
asterisk on-screen (after Palef, 1978). Subjects responded to the relative position of the word via 
the numeric keypad arrow keys. Each of 120 trials presented stimuli until response. Forty trials 
presented words that were congruent with both absolute location and relative position (e.g., 
“LEFT” presented to the left of the asterisk and both presented to the left of fixation), 40 
presented words that were congruent for absolute location but incongruent for relative position 
(e.g., “LEFT” presented right of the asterisk and both presented left of fixation), and 40 
presented words that were incongruent for both absolute location and relative position (e.g., 
“LEFT” presented right of the asterisk and both presented right of fixation). Dependent measures 
were RTs and error rates for trials where both absolute location and relative position were 
congruent and where both were incongruent. 
Attention constraint tasks 
Constraint tasks required subjects to identify targets amid visual distractors. Sometimes 
distractors evoked stimulus–response (S-R) conflict by cuing an erroneous response (e.g., in a 
task with central H or S targets: SSHSS; HHSHH) and sometimes they evoked only stimulus–
stimulus (S-S) conflict because they were not associated with an allowable response 
(e.g., BBHBB; Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990). We used six flanker and cued-search 
tasks to represent this construct; four presented both S-R and S-S conditions, one presented S-R 
conflict only, and one presented S-S conflict only. 
Arrow Flanker (ARROFLNK) 
Subjects reported the direction that a centrally presented arrow (“<” vs. “>”) via key-press, with 
the arrow flanked horizontally by 4 distractors. Each trial presented a fixation cross just below 
the upcoming target, followed by the target-distractor array (and fixation symbol). In each of two 
blocks of 96 trials, 24 neutral trials presented the target arrow amid dots (“•”), 24 congruent trials 
presented arrays with target and distractor arrows all pointing in the same direction, 24 S-R 
incongruent trials presented the target pointing in the opposite direction as distractors, and 24 S-
S incongruent trials presented the target amid upward pointing arrows. Dependent measures for 
S-R conflict were RTs for congruent and S-R incongruent trials, and for S-S conflict were RTs 
for neutral and S-S incongruent trials. 
Letter Flanker (LETTFLNK) 
Subjects reported the direction of a centrally presented letter “F” (normal vs. backward) via key-
press, with that letter flanked horizontally by 6 distractors. Each of 144 trials presented a fixation 
cross presented in the location of the upcoming target, followed by seven underline symbols 
(“_”) that cued the locations of the stimuli in the upcoming target-distractor array. Twenty-four 
neutral trials presented the target F or backward-F amid dots, 48 congruent trials presented arrays 
with the target and distractor Fs all facing the same direction, 24 S-R incongruent trials presented 
the target facing the opposite direction as distractors, and 24 S-S incongruent trials presented the 
target amid right- and left-facing Es and tilted Ts at 90° and 270°. Dependent measures for S-R 
conflict were RTs for S-R incongruent trials and 24 of the congruent trials (selected randomly for 
each subject), and for S-S conflict were RTs for neutral and S-S incongruent trials. (During the 
first semester of data collection, target letter location was varied and cued on each trial, but the 
data indicated that subjects did not use the cues; we thus adjusted the task for all remaining 
subjects, as above, and retained only their task data.) 
Conditional Accuracy Flanker (ACCYFLNK) 
Following Heitz and Engle (2007), subjects reported whether a centrally presented letter was an 
H or S via key-press, with the central letter flanked horizontally by 4 distractors; each of two 
blocks presented a response deadline—600 ms for block 1 and 500 ms for block 2—with 
instructions to respond as quickly as possible, before the deadline, by sacrificing accuracy if 
necessary. Every missed deadline was followed immediately by “Deadline Missed. Faster!” on-
screen for 1000 ms; the program checked the proportion of met deadlines every 15 trials and, if 
10 or more were missed, subjects saw: “You are missing too many deadlines. You MUST 
respond faster, even if it means making errors.” Each trial presented a fixation dot presented just 
above the upcoming target stimulus, followed by a warning tone (subjects wore headphones) and 
then the stimulus array for 100 ms. Each block presented 64 trials: 32 congruent trials presenting 
arrays of all one letter (SSSSS, HHHHH), 16 S-R conflict trials presenting a target flanked by the 
opposite letter (SSHSS, HHSHH), and 16 S-S conflict trials presenting a target flanked by Bs 
(BBSBB, BBHBB). Dependent measures for S-R conflict were error rates for S-R incongruent 
trials and 32 congruent trials (randomly selected for each subject), and for S-S conflict were error 
rates for S-S incongruent trials and 32 congruent trials (randomly selected for each subject). 
Masked Flanker (MASKFLNK) 
Subjects reported the identity of a centrally positioned letter (D, F, G, H, J, K) by pressing its 
corresponding key; the target was flanked above, below, to the left, and right by four distractors, 
yielding a cross-shaped array (see Styles & Allport, 1986). On each of the 192 trials, the entire 
array appeared above or below fixation, cued by a dot in the location of the upcoming target. A 
variable-duration blank screen (1100–2300 ms) preceded the stimulus array that appeared for 50 
or 70 ms (determined randomly) and then was pattern masked. Forty-eight neutral trials 
presented distractor colons (“:”), 36 congruent trials presented distractor letters that matched the 
target, 36 S-R conflict trials presented distractors from the target letter set, and 36 S-S conflict 
trials presented distractor letters that were not allowable targets. Dependent measures for S-R 
conflict were error rates for S-R incongruent trials and congruent trials, and for S-S conflict were 
error rates for S-S incongruent trials and neutral trials. 
Cued Search (CUEDSRCH) 
Subjects reported the direction that a target letter “F” (or backward-F) faced, via key-press; the 
letter appeared equally often in one of 8 locations along the inner 3 × 3 square within a 5 × 5 
matrix, with different eligible locations cued on each trial (Poole & Kane, 2009). The possible 
target locations on each trial were precued by a 2- or 4-headed arrow at fixation, indicating the 
allowable two or four target locations to search on each trial (50% of each). We instructed 
subjects to use these cues to maintain focus on the cued locations. Nontarget locations were 
populated randomly by right- and left-facing Es and tilted Ts at 90° or 270°, plus one “lure” (an 
F or backward-F in a noncued location along the internal 3 × 3 square or in the central location). 
The presence of the lure required subjects to focus on the cued locations only. Each of 160 trials 
began with a 2- or 4-location cue, then a fixation grid of dots appearing in each of the upcoming 
5 × 5 locations for 1500 ms, and then the stimulus array. Because each trial presented a lure, the 
dependent measure—mean RT across all trials—reflected S-R conflict. 
Circle Flanker (CIRCFLNK) 
Subjects reported whether a target letter was an X or N, via key-press, with the target flanked by 
two different distractors (from the set H, K, M, V, Y, Z). Targets appeared in one of eight 
equidistant locations in a circular arrangement, with distractors appearing one position clockwise 
and counterclockwise from the target; the other positions were occupied by colons. Each of 160 
trials presented a fixation cross followed by an underline cue appearing just beneath the 
upcoming target location; the target-distractor array then appeared after a variable-length blank 
screen. Eighty neutral trials presented the target letter surrounded by colons and 80 S-S conflict 
trials presented the target flanked by two letter distractors. The dependent measures were RTs for 
S-S incongruent trials and neutral trials. 
Thought probes 
In five tasks (and one practice task), subjects reported their immediately preceding thoughts by 
responding to unpredictably appearing probes. Each probe asked “What are you thinking about?” 
and had subjects “Please press a number on the keyboard” that most closely matched their 
thought content in the instant before the probe (see McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012a, 2012b). The 
on-screen choices (italicized below) were reexplained for each probed task: 1. The task, on-task 
thoughts about the stimuli or response; 2. Task experience/performance, evaluative thoughts 
about one’s task performance; 3. Everyday things, thoughts about routine things that have 
happened or may happen; 4. Current state of being, thoughts about one’s current physical or 
emotional state, such as being sleepy, hungry, or cheerful; 5. Personal worries, thoughts about 
one’s concerns or worries; 6. Daydreams, fantastic thoughts disconnected from reality; 7. 
External environment, thoughts about something task-unrelated in the immediate environment; 8. 
Other, only those thoughts that do not fit the other categories. The TUT dependent measure for 
each task (aside from the unanalyzed Probe Practice task) was the proportion of probe responses 
3 to 8. 
Probe practice 
As the first (unanalyzed) task of the study, subjects practiced responding to probes. Ninety trials 
presented Xs in a warm (red, yellow, pink) or cool (blue, dark blue, purple) color for 3000 ms; 
subjects judged warm versus cold via key-press. Probes followed 12 (13.3%) trials. 
Semantic SART (SART-TUT) 
Probes followed 45 no-go target trials (i.e., 7% of All SART trials). 
Number Stroop (NUMS-TUT) 
Two unanalyzed probes appeared in the first block of the task and 20 to-be-analyzed probes 
appeared in the second block (13% of block-2 trials), always after incongruent trials. 
Arrow Flanker (ARRO-TUT) 
Four probes appeared in the first trial block (4.2% of block-1 trials) and 16 appeared in the 
second block (16.6% of block-2 trials); we analyzed all 20 probe responses. 
Letter Flanker (LETT-TUT) 
Of the 12 probes presented during the task (following 8.3% of all trials), 4 appeared following 
congruent trials, 2 following neutral trials, 2 following S-R incongruent trials, 2 following S-S 
incongruent trials, and 2 following trials of the exploratory (unanalyzed) trial type. 
2-Back (2BAC-TUT) 
Fifteen probes (6.3% of trials) appeared during an independent, nonanalyzed task (McVay, 
Meier, Touron, & Kane, 2013). Subjects decided whether each word matched the one presented 
two trials ago; 25% of trials were 2-back matching targets, and 21% were 1- and 3-back lures. 
General Procedure 
We tested subjects in groups of 1 to 4, each at their own workstation. Each of 3 sessions lasted 
approximately 120 min. Subjects scheduled all sessions within one academic semester; 
the M duration between Sessions 1 and 2 was 18.4 days (SD = 15.8) and between Sessions 2 and 
3 was 17.4 days (SD = 14.1). Table 1 presents the session and order of task completion for all 
subjects. All subjects also completed a demographics questionnaire at the beginning of Session 1 
about age, gender, race, and ethnicity. 
Table 1. Task Order Across Three Laboratory Sessions, Fixed for All Subjects 
 
 
An experimenter read aloud all on-screen instructions and remained to answer questions and 
monitor subjects (and record problems). Experimenters initiated a task only when all subjects in 
a session finished the prior task, and subjects left the session only after the last subject completed 
the last task. 
Results 
We calculated descriptive statistics after each of the first several semesters of data collection in 
order to check for floor and ceiling effects, and thus modified two problematic tasks after the 
first semester (see Method). Inferential statistics were not conducted until completion of the 
entire project. 
Data Analysis Exclusions 
As noted above, 472 of the 545 consented subjects completed all 3 sessions. We analyzed data 
from all 541 subjects who completed the first session and did not have their data excluded 
casewise (see below). Missing observations were handled via full-information maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimation. Given certain assumptions, simulation studies show that the ML 
approach provides unbiased parameter estimates (but slightly higher standard errors) when 
observations are missing (Enders, 2010; McKnight, McKnight, Sidani, & Figueredo, 2007). The 
models were estimated with Mplus 7.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012), using maximum likelihood 
with robust standard errors. 
Experimenter Notes 
All data-exclusion decisions, based on session notes recorded by experimenters, were made 
jointly by the first three authors at the completion of the project, while blind to the subjects’ task 
or questionnaire data. Our conservative approach dropped subjects casewise (from all analyses) 
or taskwise (from one or more tasks) only with clear evidence and specification of a significant 
problem that likely compromised the subject’s data. We excluded all data from four subjects, two 
who fell asleep in multiple tasks across sessions, one with poor English comprehension who did 
not understand task instructions, and one with self-declared dyslexia and difficulty with all letter 
stimuli. We excluded all performance data—retaining questionnaire data—from one subject who 
fell asleep during many of the performance tasks but not the schizotypy questionnaires. We 
excluded subjects’ data from individual tasks, typically for falling asleep, not following 
instructions, or stopping a task because of illness. In all, 20 subjects had data excluded from one 
or more tasks. For these subjects, we deleted data from M = 1.4 tasks (Mdn = 1; range = 1–3). 
Complex Span Task Processing Accuracy 
Complex span tasks required subjects to engage an unrelated processing task between items; if 
subjects do not comply with this demand, their memory data may be contaminated by rehearsal 
strategies. As is conventional, we excluded subjects’ data from operation (N = 57), reading (N = 
53), symmetry (N = 66), or rotation (N = 74) span for processing accuracy <85% (e.g., Conway 
et al., 2005; Redick et al., 2012). 
Outliers 
The first two authors jointly based all taskwise data-exclusion decisions about outlying scores on 
the individual task conditions from which the analyzed dependent measures (i.e., difference 
scores) would be derived, while blind to subjects’ other task scores. Our conservative strategy 
was to base exclusions exclusively on neutral and congruent conditions, rather than the 
theoretically critical incongruent conditions, and to define outliers via boxplots, as any 
observations falling more than three times the interquartile range (IQR) away from the upper or 
lower hinges of the plot. For tasks using error rates as the dependent measure, we did not drop 
data based on outlying RTs; for tasks using RTs as the dependent measure, we dropped data 
based on outlying neutral or congruent RTs or below-chance accuracy in neutral or congruent 
trials. Altogether, we excluded data from three subjects in Semantic SART, 10 subjects in 
Number Stroop, seven subjects in Spatial Stroop, two subjects in Arrow Flanker, five subjects in 
Letter Flanker, 10 subjects in Conditional Accuracy flanker, 13 subjects in Cued Search, and 12 
subjects in Circle Flanker. 
Infrequency Responses in Questionnaire Measures 
We excluded the questionnaire data from seven subjects because of elevated infrequency scores 
(total infrequency score of 5 or higher across both sessions’ schizotypy scales). 
Other Missing Data 
All other missing data were a result of subjects not completing particular tasks or sessions, or to 
lost data attributable to computer or experimenter error (or, as noted above, attributable to 
revisions to the antisaccade arrows and letter flanker tasks following the first semester of data 
collection). 
Difference-Score Calculations 
For Stroop and flanker tasks, the dependent measures reflected the difference in RT or error rate 
between incongruent trials and congruent or neutral trials. We evaluated four possible indicators 
by examining their correlations with only the tasks designed for that same construct (i.e., 
Number and Spatial Stroop difference scores only with each other and the other restraint tasks; 
all the flanker measures of constraint only with each other). We thus determined which 
difference score provided the best indicators of the intended constructs without being influenced 
by how these difference scores might affect between-construct associations. All four difference-
score assessments correlated strongly (almost all rs > .95), but a “residual” measure most 
consistently provided the best within-construct correlations. So, for all relevant tasks and 
analyses, we expressed difference scores for each subject as the residual of the incongruent trials 
regressed on their congruent or neutral trials. Our only exception was for Number Stroop, which 
did not correlate with the other restraint measures regardless of difference-score method; we 
instead used the mean incongruent RT from each subject, which did generally correlate with the 
other restraint measures (for similar results and resolution, see McVay & Kane, 2012b). For 
Spatial Stroop, we used the residual difference score for error rates because it correlated better 
with other restraint tasks than did RTs. 
Final Sample Demographics 
Sixty-six percent of our 541 analyzed subjects self-identified as female and 34% as male (5 
missing cases), with a mean age of 19 years (SD = 2; 2 missing cases). Also by self-report, the 
racial composition of the sample was 49% White (European/Middle Eastern descent); 34% Black 
(African/Caribbean descent); 7% Multiracial; 4% Asian; <1% Native American/Alaskan Native; 
0% Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander; 4% Other (4 missing cases). Finally, self-reported 
ethnicity, asked separately, was 7% Latino/Hispanic (1 missing case). 
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations 
Tables 2 and 3 provide descriptive statistics for the questionnaire and cognitive-task measures, 
respectively. All variables showed reasonably normal distributions; although three variables 
were leptokurtic, none were both skewed and leptokurtic enough to require transformation. Table 
2 shows that endorsement rates on the schizotypy questionnaires were low, as expected given 
their implied deviance (e.g., Horton et al., 2014; Kwapil et al., 2008), but we still obtained 
substantial variability: Scores on each scale ranged from 0 to near maximum. Table 3 indicates 
mean TUT rates (proportions of thought reports indicated as off-task) of about .45 to .60 across 
tasks, and minimum and maximum rates from .00 to 1.00. 




Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Cognitive-Performance and Thought-Probe Measures 
 
 
Before conducting multivariate analyses, we censored any scores that were ≥4 SDs from the 
mean and replaced them with a value of 3.999 SDs (affecting 0.2% of scores). Table 4 presents 
the correlation matrix (reliabilities along the diagonal) that provides evidence for convergent and 
discriminant validity. Indicators of a given construct correlated well with each other and more 
strongly than with indicators of other constructs. The schizotypy constructs were particularly 
well captured, with Perceptual Aberration, Magical Ideation, and Referential Thinking scores 
correlating as indices of positive schizotypy, with Social and Physical Anhedonia scores 
correlating as indices of negative schizotypy, with Paranoid Checklist and Suspiciousness scores 
correlating strongly as indices of paranoid schizotypy, and with Cognitive Slippage, Cognitive 
Dysfunction, Odd Speech, and Odd Behavior scores correlated strongly as indices of 
disorganized schizotypy. At the same time, and consistent with prior research (Cicero & Kerns, 
2010; Horton et al., 2014; Stefanis et al., 2002), measures of positive, paranoid, and disorganized 
schizotypy correlated more strongly with each other (Mdn r = .44) than with indicators of 




Table 4. Correlations Among All Measures Used in Subsequent Analyses (Reliabilities 
Presented on Diagonal in Parentheses) 
 
 
Table 4. (Continued) 
 
The cognitive tasks were more variable in capturing their intended constructs. Working memory 
tasks correlated well with one another, with somewhat stronger correlations for tasks of the same 
content domain (verbal vs. spatial), but substantial correlations across domains (see Kane et al., 
2004). TUT rate correlations similarly indicated a stable, trait-like construct, but they also 
suggested state-like influences, with strongest correlations within the same experimental session 
(Mdn r = .60) versus across different sessions (Mdn r = .39). For attention restraint tasks, 
whereas antisaccade tasks and the SART measures correlated well, the Stroop measures 
correlated more weakly with them and with each other. Attention constraint tasks performed 
more poorly, overall. Although the S-R and S-S interference measures taken from the same task 
correlated well, the S-R measures and the S-S measures correlated weakly across tasks. 
Although latent-variable models will be critical to assessing the associations between constructs, 
the correlation matrix suggests that between-construct correlations varied substantially across 
domains. WMC tasks correlated more strongly with attention restraint than with constraint tasks 
and generally weakly with TUTs. Restraint tasks correlated reasonably well with both WMC and 
attention constraint tasks, as well as with TUT rates. Constraint tasks correlated more weakly 
with TUT rates than did restraint tasks. Finally, our cognitive measures did not strongly predict 
schizotypy measures, with most correlations weaker than r = .10; however, the cognition-
schizotypy correlations that were stronger than .10 tended to cluster between attention restraint 
and both paranoid and disorganized schizotypy measures, and between TUTs and positive, 
paranoid, and disorganized schizotypy measures. 
Latent Variable Models 
Latent variable models allowed us to evaluate associations at the construct level, relatively free 
of method- and task-specific variance. We designed our questionnaire (criterion) measures to tap 
four constructs: negative, positive, paranoid, and disorganized schizotypy. We intended our 
cognitive (predictor) tasks to measure WMC, TUT rate, attention restraint, and attention 
constraint. Here, we first test measurement models (via confirmatory factor analysis) separately 
for our criterion and predictor constructs. Note that higher scores on WMC factors indicate better 
performance, whereas higher scores for TUT rate, attention restraint, and attention constraint 
factors indicate worse performance. 
For all model testing (using Mplus 7.0), we report several fit statistics. Nonsignificant chi-square 
tests indicate adequate model fit; with large samples like ours, however, they are nearly always 
significant and so we also report χ2/df, for which values ≤2 indicate adequate fit. Comparative fit 
indices (CFI) and Tucker-Lewis indices (TLI) of ≥ .90 indicate adequate fit, whereas the Root 
Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA; with its 90% CI) and Standardized Root Mean 
Square Residual (SRMR) values of ≤ .08 indicate adequate fit (e.g., Schermelleh-Engel, 
Moosbrugger, & Müller, 2003). 
Measurement Model: Questionnaire Measures 
We tested a 4-factor schizotypy model, consistent with prior research using these and related 
self-report instruments (e.g., Cicero & Kerns, 2010; Horton et al., 2014; Stefanis et al., 2002). 
The model included a positive schizotypy factor loaded by perceptual aberration, magical 
ideation, and referential ideas scales (also with cross-loadings from social anhedonia; Kwapil et 
al., 2008; E. Smith et al., 2016), a paranoid factor loaded by paranoia and suspiciousness 
measures, a disorganized factor loaded by cognitive slippage-dysfunction and odd behavior-
speech questionnaires, and a negative factor loaded by physical and social anhedonia measures. 
Following published recommendations (Coffman & MacCallum, 2005; Little, Cunningham, 
Shahar, & Widaman, 2002) and consistent with our previous work (e.g., Kwapil et al., 2008), we 
divided each of the four WSS scales into three parcels, and the Paranoia Checklist into two 
parcels, in order to produce more robust estimates. We did not compute parcels for the other 
scales because they had fewer items. To create parcels, we distributed groups of items to the 
parcels in sequential order to ensure that each parcel contained a comparable proportion of items 
from the beginning, middle, and end of each scale. We allowed residual correlations among 
parcels from the same measure. 
Table 5 indicates that the measurement model, depicted in Figure 1, provided a good fit to the 
data, with only one nonsignificant factor loading (one Social Anhedonia parcel on positive 
schizotypy). As predicted, positive schizotypy correlated strongly with the paranoid and 
disorganized factors, which also correlated strongly with each other. Also as expected, negative 
schizotypy correlated nonsignificantly with the positive, paranoid, and disorganized factors.  






Figure 1. Four-factor measurement model of the schizotypy questionnaires. All solid paths are 
statistically significant at p < .05; all dotted paths are nonsignificant. The circles represent the 
latent variables for negative schizotypy (Negative), positive schizotypy (Positive), disorganized 
schizotypy (Disorgz), and paranoid schizotypy (Paranoid). The boxes represent the observed 
variables loaded onto each latent factor. The arrows represent the modeled direction of the 
pathway between variables (double-headed arrows indicate correlation). Numbers next to boxes 
indicate task factor loadings (leftmost column indicates loadings onto positive, disorganized, or 
paranoid factors; rightmost column indicates loadings onto the negative factor), numbers along 
double-headed arrows indicate correlations between constructs. For the observed variables, 
PHY-ANHD1 = physical anhedonia scale (item parcel 1), PHY-ANHD2 = physical anhedonia 
scale (parcel 2), PHY-ANHD3 = physical anhedonia scale (parcel 3), SOC-ANHD1 = social 
anhedonia scale (parcel 1), SOC-ANHD2 = social anhedonia scale (parcel 2), SOC-ANHD3 = 
social anhedonia scale (parcel 3), PERCABER1 = perceptual aberration scale (parcel 1), 
PERCABER2 = perceptual aberration scale (parcel 2), PERCABER3 = perceptual aberration 
scale (parcel 3), MAGIDEA1 = magical ideation scale (parcel 1), MAGIDEA2 = magical 
ideation scale (parcel 2), MAGIDEA3 = magical ideation scale (parcel 3), REFTHINK = 
referential thinking subscale from the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ), COGSLIPG 
= cognitive slippage scale, COGDYSRG = cognitive dysregulation subscale of the Dimensional 
Assessment of Personality Pathology–Basic Questionnaire, ODSPEECH = SPQ odd speech 
subscale, ODBEHAVR = SPQ odd behavior subscale, PARACHEK1 = paranoia checklist (item 
parcel 1), PARACHEK2 = paranoia checklist (parcel 2), SUSPICIO = SPQ suspiciousness 
subscale. 
Measurement Models: Cognitive Measures 
For models of the cognitive tasks, we allowed residual correlations among a limited number of 
manifest variables, a priori: operation and reading span to account for shared method variance as 
complex span tasks with verbal memoranda, symmetry, and rotation span to account for shared 
method variance as complex span tasks with visuospatial memoranda, and the SART d′ and 
SART RT standard deviation measures. We also made three post hoc modeling decisions after 
considering the bivariate correlations in Table 3. First, because TUT measures from the same 
session correlated more strongly than they did across sessions, indicating both state- and trait-
based variation, we allowed residual correlations for the within-session pairs. Second, the S-R 
and S-S effects within each flanker task were much more strongly correlated than we anticipated, 
so we let them correlate. Finally, we dropped Cued Search from all analyses because it seemed to 
correlate more strongly with the attention restraint than constraint tasks, so it was neither a good 
constraint measure (as we designed it to be) nor an a priori restraint measure. 
We tested two kinds of models with our cognitive tasks: (a) a 4-factor model with separate but 
correlated constructs reflecting WMC, TUT rate, attention restraint, and attention constraint; (b) 
a nested “bifactor” model with a common “executive” factor reflecting the variance common to 
all the cognitive measures and two residual “WMC-r” and “TUT-r” factors reflecting the 
variance shared among the indicators of these constructs that was not shared with the other 
measures. 
4-factor model 
The 4-factor model presented in Figure 2 provided an adequate fit to the data (see Table 5). 
Although some attention-task loadings were weak, all were statistically significant, and the 
model suggested four correlated latent variables. Propensity for mind wandering during ongoing 
tasks was a stable trait across multiple tasks and occasions (see also McVay & Kane, 
2012b; Mrazek et al., 2012; Unsworth & McMillan, 2014). Inconsistent with Friedman and 
Miyake (2004), however, we could not fix the restraint–constraint correlation to equal 1.0 and 
still fit the data. That model would not converge here, and so along with the fact that the 95% 
confidence interval around the correlation [.46, .74] did not include 1.0, our findings indicate that 
restraint and constraint capabilities are distinguishable constructs. 
 
 
Figure 2. Four-factor measurement model of the cognitive variables. All paths are statistically 
significant at p < .05. The circles represent the latent variables for working memory capacity 
(WMC), attention restraint failure [Attn Restraint (Fails)], attention constraint failure [Attn 
Constraint (Fails)], and mind wandering rate (TUTs). The boxes represent the observed 
variables loaded onto each latent factor. The arrows represent the modeled direction of the 
pathway between variables (double-headed arrows indicate correlation). Numbers next to boxes 
indicate task factor loadings, numbers along double-headed arrows indicate correlations 
between constructs. For the observed variables, OPERSPAN = operation span, READSPAN = 
reading span, SYMMSPAN = symmetry span, ROTASPAN = rotation span, RUNNSPAN = 
running span, COUNTERS = updating counters, ANTI-LET = antisaccade with letters, ANTI-
ARO = antisaccade with arrows, SEM-SART d′ = d′ score from semantic SART, SEM-SART rtsd 
= intrasubject standard deviation in RT from semantic SART, N-Stroop = number Stroop, S-
Stroop = spatial Stroop, ARROFLNK-SR = Stimulus–response (S-R) conflict effect in arrow 
flanker, ARROFLNK-SS = Stimulus–stimulus (S-S) conflict effect in arrow flanker, LETTFLNK-
SR = S-R conflict effect in letter flanker, LETTFLNK-SOS = S-S conflict effect in letter flanker, 
ACCYFLNK-SR = S-R conflict effect in conditional accuracy flanker, ACCYFLNK-SS = S-S 
conflict effect in conditional accuracy flanker, MASKFLNK-SR = S-R conflict effect in masked 
flanker, MASKFLNK-SS = S-S conflict effect in masked flanker, CIRCFLNK = circle flanker, 
SART-TUT = proportion of TUTs reported in the semantic SART, LETT-TUT = proportion of 
TUTs reported in letter flanker, ARRO-TUT = proportion of TUTS reported in arrow flanker, 
NUMS-TUT = proportion of TUTs reported in number Stroop, 2BAC-TUT = proportion of TUTs 
reported in two-back task. 
WMC was strongly associated with attention restraint (higher WMC scores predicted less 
restraint failure) and less strongly, but substantially, with constraint (higher WMC scores 
predicted less constraint failure). Among the attention-related constructs, TUT rate was least 
strongly associated with WMC, with a similarly modest correlation to other latent-variable 
studies from our laboratory (≈ −.20; McVay & Kane, 2012a, 2012b). TUT rate was more 
strongly correlated with both restraint failures and constraint failures. 
Bifactor model 
Using the same variables as in the 4-factor model above, the bifactor model presented in Figure 
3 provided an adequate fit (see Table 5). All tasks loaded significantly onto the general 
“Executive Attention” factor, indicating common variance across these diverse measures, 
although many tasks’ loadings (particularly for TUT rates and flanker tasks) were less than .30. 
The residual WMC and TUT factors both had substantial task loadings, indicating ample WMC-




Figure 3. Bifactor measurement model of the cognitive variables. All paths are statistically 
significant at p < .05. The circles represent the latent variables for Common Executive Failures 
[Common Exec (Fail)], the “residual” variance shared only among the WMC measures 
(WMCRes), and the “residual” variance shared only among the mind wandering measures 
(TUTRes). The boxes represent the observed variables loaded onto each latent factor. The 
arrows represent the modeled direction of the pathway between variables (double-headed 
arrows indicate correlation). The rightmost column of numbers next to boxes indicates factor 
loadings onto the Common Executive factor and the leftmost column of numbers next to the 
boxes indicates factor loadings on the WMC-specific or TUT-specific factors. For the observed 
variables, OPERSPAN = operation span, READSPAN = reading span, SYMMSPAN = symmetry 
span, ROTASPAN = rotation span, RUNNSPAN = running span, COUNTERS = updating 
counters, ANTI-LET = antisaccade with letters, ANTI-ARO = antisaccade with arrows, SEM-
SART d′ = d′ score from semantic SART, SEM-SART rtsd = intrasubject standard deviation in 
RT from semantic SART, N-Stroop = number Stroop, S-Stroop = spatial Stroop, ARROFLNK-SR 
= Stimulus–response (S-R) conflict effect in arrow flanker, ARROFLNK-SOS = Stimulus–
stimulus (S-S) conflict effect in arrow flanker, LETTFLNK-SR = S-R conflict effect in letter 
flanker, LETTFLNK-SOS = S-S conflict effect in letter flanker, ACCYFLNK-SR = S-R conflict 
effect in conditional accuracy flanker, ACCYFLNK-SS = S-S conflict effect in conditional 
accuracy flanker, MASKFLNK-SR = S-R conflict effect in masked flanker, MASKFLNK-SS = S-S 
conflict effect in masked flanker, CIRCFLNK = circle flanker, SART-TUT = proportion of TUTs 
reported in the semantic SART, LETT-TUT = proportion of TUTs reported in letter flanker, 
ARRO-TUT = proportion of TUTS reported in arrow flanker, NUMS-TUT = proportion of TUTs 
reported in number Stroop, 2BAC-TUT = proportion of TUTs reported in two-back task. 
Confirmatory Factor Analyses of the Cognitive and Questionnaire Measures 
The following confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) assessed the correlations between the 
cognitive predictor constructs and the schizotypy outcome constructs. Across all models, the 
outcomes reflected the four schizotypy factors from the measurement model (positive, paranoid, 
disorganized, negative). 
Four-factor predictor model 
As expected from the individual measurement models, the full model with all predictor and 
criterion constructs provided an adequate fit to the data (see Table 5 for fit statistics; see Table 
6 for all factor loadings). Figure 4 shows that none of the cognitive constructs correlated 
significantly with negative schizotypy. Positive, disorganized, and paranoid schizotypy factors, 
in contrast, shared significant variance with both TUT rate and attention restraint failure (with 
the exception of positive schizotypy × restraint; p = .052). Neither WMC nor attention constraint 














Table 6. Standardized Factor Loadings (With Standard Errors) for Confirmatory Factor 
Analyses and Structural Equation Models 
 





Figure 4. Confirmatory factor analysis depicting the relations between the four-factor cognitive 
model and the four-factor schizotypy model. The circles represent the latent variables for 
working memory capacity (WMC), attention restraint failure [Attn Restraint (Fails)], attention 
constraint failure [Attn Constraint (Fails)], mind wandering rate (TUTs), negative schizotypy 
(Negative), positive schizotypy (Positive), disorganized schizotypy (Disorgz), and paranoid 
schizotypy (Paranoid). Double-headed arrows represent correlations between constructs. All 
solid paths are statistically significant at p < .05; all dotted paths are nonsignificant. For ease of 
interpretation, factor loadings for manifest variables are not depicted (see Table 6). 
Bifactor predictor model 
This model also provided adequate fit (see Tables 5 and 6 and Figure 5). Again, negative 
schizotypy did not correlate with the cognitive predictors. In contrast to the 4-factor model, 
however, only the residual-TUT factor correlated with positive schizotypy. Paranoia and 
disorganization also correlated with residual-TUT, and they additionally correlated with the 
general executive factor, reflecting failures of executive control. 
 
 
Figure 5. Confirmatory factor analysis depicting the relations between the bifactor cognitive 
model and the four-factor schizotypy model. The circles represent the latent variables for 
Common Executive Failures [Common Exec (Fail)], the “residual” variance shared only among 
the WMC measures (WMCRes), and the “residual” variance shared only among the mind 
wandering measures (TUTRes), negative schizotypy (Negative), positive schizotypy (Positive), 
disorganized schizotypy (Disorgz), and paranoid schizotypy (Paranoid). Double-headed arrows 
represent correlations between constructs. All solid paths are statistically significant at p < .05; 
all dotted paths are nonsignificant. For ease of interpretation, factor loadings for manifest 
variables are not depicted (see Table 6). 
Structural Equation Models 
We used a structural equation model (SEM) to assess the unique predictive power of the four-
factor model’s cognitive constructs (because the bifactor model requires orthogonal predictors, 
its SEM results are identical to the CFA results presented above). SEMs are analogous to 
simultaneous regression, with path coefficients reflecting the unique variance accounted for by 
each predictor (and so interpreted like standardized beta weights in regression). Note that the fit 
statistics and the factor loadings for the SEM model are identical to those from the corresponding 
CFA model presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
Figure 6 shows that none of the cognitive factors predicted significant variance in negative 
schizotypy. Although both TUT rate and restraint failures had correlated with positive 
schizotypy and disorganization in the CFA, only TUT rate predicted unique variance in each. For 
paranoia, in contrast, both TUT rate and restraint failure predicted significant variance. 
 
 
Figure 6. Structural equation model depicting the prediction of the four-factor schizotypy model 
by the four-factor cognitive model. The circles represent the latent variables for working memory 
capacity (WMC), attention restraint failure [Attn Restraint (Fails)], attention constraint failure 
[Attn Constraint (Fails)], mind wandering rate (TUTs), negative schizotypy (Negative), positive 
schizotypy (Positive), disorganized schizotypy (Disorgz), and paranoid schizotypy (Paranoid). 
Arrows represent the modeled direction of pathway between constructs. All solid paths are 
statistically significant at p < .05; all dotted paths are nonsignificant. For ease of interpretation, 
factor loadings for manifest variables are not depicted (see Table 6). 
Secondary Latent Variable Analyses With CoV Measures 
We added a CoV factor, indicated by manifest variables representing the CoV values for 
nonconflict trials from five tasks (SART, number Stroop, spatial Stroop, arrow flanker, and letter 
flanker, with separate variables for neutral and congruent trials for arrow and letter flanker 
tasks). We changed the Constraint factor to eliminate the arrow and letter flanker tasks, and the 
Restraint factor to eliminate SART and number Stroop, because these contributed to the CoV 
construct. This ensured that any construct correlations with CoV were not attributable to shared 
task variance (a priori, we attempted to retain SART d′ as an accuracy measure of restraint, but it 
was so strongly correlated with SART CoV that it drove the correlation between Restraint and 
CoV factors to >1.0; we therefore dropped SART d′ from the model). 
Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics for the CoV variables, and Table 8 presents bivariate 
correlations among the CoV measures and between the CoV and other variables in the latent 
variable models. The CoV variables correlated modestly with one another, with strongest 
correlations between indicators from the same task. Not surprisingly, then, they did not correlate 
strongly with other cognitive measures. Finally, CoV indices did not strongly predict schizotypy, 
with most rs < .10. The CoV–schizotypy correlations that were stronger than .10 clustered in 
positive schizotypy. 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for RT Coefficient of Variation Measures 
 
 




A CFA tested whether the CoV variables reflected a common factor and, if so, how strongly it 
correlated with executive and schizotypy constructs. In modeling the CoV data, we allowed 
residual correlations between the two measures from arrow flanker and from letter flanker. As 
shown in Table 5, the model fit the data (see Table 6 for factor loadings). First, a CoV factor 
emerged across tasks, indicating a coherent construct (factor loadings = .36–.50). Second, the 
CoV factor correlated moderately to-strongly with the cognitive constructs: WMC (−.32), 
restraint (.48), constraint (.24), and TUTs (.54). Like the other executive constructs in the 
previous models, CoV did not correlate with negative schizotypy (.04). It did, however, correlate 
modestly with positive (.28), paranoid (.20), and disorganized schizotypy (.16). 
Discussion 
 
Latent variable analyses of our large-N correlational dataset indicated both “unity and diversity” 
(Miyake & Friedman, 2012) of executive attention constructs, in both their associations to one 
another and their prediction of schizotypy. Our primary findings regarding the individual-
difference structure of executive control were that (a) WMC, TUTs, attention restraint, and 
attention constraint were correlated but separable, (b) WMC correlated more strongly with 
attention restraint than constraint, and TUTs more strongly with restraint and constraint than with 
WMC, (c) the cognitive constructs were strongly enough associated that a common executive 
factor fit the data, along with residual factors for WMC- and TUT-specific variation, and (d) 
CoV measured from the “control” trials of attention tasks shared enough variance to derive a 
latent variable that correlated strongly with restraint and TUTs and moderately with WMC. 
Executive attention factors predicted variation in schizotypy in our undergraduate sample, but 
only modestly and selectively. Our primary findings regarding the cognitive correlates of 
schizotypy were that (a) None of the executive factors predicted negative schizotypy, (b) TUT 
propensity consistently predicted positive, disorganized, and paranoid schizotypy, above and 
beyond the variance it shared with other executive constructs, (c) attention restraint correlated 
most strongly with paranoia, predicting variance above and beyond TUTs and other executive 
factors; although restraint failure also predicted positive and disorganized schizotypy, it did not 
do so over and above TUT rate, (d) neither WMC nor attention constraint correlated with 
schizotypy factors, and (e) RT variability (CoV), like TUTs and attention restraint, correlated 
with positive, disorganized, and paranoid schizotypy, but CoV correlated most strongly with 
positive (and was positive schizotypy’s strongest predictor in any model). 
Executive Attention Deficits in Schizotypy? 
Our review of the schizotypy literature suggested inconsistent cognitive findings and widespread 
measurement problems. We sought to correct many of the literature’s weaknesses with a large-
N study, distinguishing four dimensions of schizotypy via multiple measures, and measuring 
several executive constructs with multiple, well-motivated tasks. Of course, no one study 
provides conclusive answers to any question, but our findings were clear: None of the executive 
abilities we assessed predicted normal variation among undergraduates in negative schizotypy, 
and we found few cognitive correlates of positive, disorganized, or paranoid schizotypy. In short, 
the stalwart executive constructs in both the schizotypy and schizophrenia literatures—WMC 
and attention restraint—were generally unimpressive as predictors of schizotypy. In contrast, our 
more novel measures—TUT rate and RT CoV—showed promise. 
The lack of associations with negative schizotypy was surprising, given that negative symptoms 
in schizophrenia often predict disrupted cognition (e.g., Addington, Addington, & Maticka-
Tyndale, 1991; Harvey, Koren, Reichenberg, & Bowie, 2006; Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 1998). Our 
lack of correlations may reflect that we measured negative schizotypy with questionnaires that 
primarily tapped anhedonia and social disinterest, but not alogia, avolition, or anergia. 
Nevertheless, some smaller-scale studies show that these same negative schizotypy measures 
predict neurological soft signs (Kaczorowski et al., 2009), and deficits in sustained attention 
(Gooding et al., 2006) and episodic memory (Sahakyan & Kwapil, 2015). 
Mind Wandering, Schizotypy, and Current Concerns 
Only mind-wandering rate consistently predicted positive, disorganized, and paranoid 
schizotypy, and it did so above and beyond any contributions of WMC and performance-based 
attention measures. People having more TUTs during attention and memory tasks also reported 
more strange perceptual experiences and beliefs (positive features), more confusion and 
cognitive difficulties (disorganized features), and more suspiciousness and persecution (paranoid 
features). These correlations were not large, but their consistency across statistical models is 
encouraging, especially for this mixed literature. Moreover, findings of increased TUTs 
corroborate the characterization of positive, disorganized, and paranoid schizotypy as reflecting 
experiential excesses, versus negative schizotypy’s experiential deficits. 
TUTs are multiply determined, so we cannot know whether the higher TUT rates in positive, 
disorganized, and paranoid schizotypy reflected uncontrolled or unwanted thought intrusions. 
However, TUTs predicted schizotypy over and above the influences of other executive measures, 
suggesting that the (residual) TUT-schizotypy associations were not attributable to control 
failures. Perhaps the TUT-schizotypy links reflect that, other things being equal, people scoring 
high on measures of positive, disorganized, and paranoid schizotypy are more vulnerable to the 
influence of current personal concerns and affective dysregulation (e.g., Klinger, 2013; McVay 
& Kane, 2010; Smallwood et al., 2009) on their stream of thought. To the extent that positive, 
disorganized, and paranoid schizotypy produce relatively loose conceptual associations and 
abundant spreading activation along semantic networks (e.g., Kreher, Holdcomb, Goff, & 
Kuperberg, 2008; Moritz, Woodward, Küppers, Lausen, & Schickel, 2003), and relatively low 
thresholds for perceptual, conceptual, or motivational salience (e.g., Kapur, 2003; Kapur, 
Mizrahi, & Li, 2005), people high on these dimensions should find more cues to trigger concern-
relevant thoughts during ongoing activities. Thus, positive, disorganized, and paranoid 
schizotypy may elicit an overabundance of interfering material for consciousness that must be 
contended with by executive-control mechanisms; paranoid thinking, in particular, should be 
reactive to a task context in which one is repeatedly probed by a computer program to report 
one’s thoughts, triggering ongoing concerns about being observed and judged by others. We 
conclude, then, in accord with the perspective that executive abilities and concern-related 
interference jointly influence mind wandering (McVay & Kane, 2010), that increased mind-
wandering in schizotypy may be more tied to the excessive activation of personal concerns than 
to a deficit in cognitive control. 
Schizotypy and Intraindividual Variation in RT 
At the same time, our executive measure that was most closely associated with mind wandering 
(see also McVay & Kane, 2012a; Unsworth, 2015)—intraindividual variation in RT—also 
predicted positive, disorganized, and paranoid schizotypy. Were these correlations redundant? 
Did RT CoV predict schizotypy simply as an alternative measure of mind-wandering propensity, 
with tuning in and out of tasks creating RT variability? Our prior work suggests that RT 
variability and TUTs are not redundant, correlating significantly but imperfectly (McVay & 
Kane, 2012a), as in the present study. RT variability may thus capture more subtle vacillation in 
attention than do TUTs; that is, some attentional fluctuations may have behavioral consequences 
without producing conscious dissociations from ongoing activities, experienced as TUTs, and 
they may be somewhat less influenced by the cuing of one’s personal concerns. 
Here, RT CoV correlated numerically more strongly with positive schizotypy than did TUT rate 
(they correlated similarly with disorganization and paranoia). We tested the relative contributions 
of CoV and TUTs to positive symptoms via a SEM version of the CFA reported above, in which 
CoV and TUT rate competed (with the other cognitive constructs) to explain unique variance in 
positive schizotypy. CoV predicted positive schizotypy (ß = .28, p = .009) but TUT rate did not 
(ß = .11, p = .200), and so CoV tells us something about positive schizotypy beyond its shared 
contribution with TUT rate. Although several studies have found increased RT variability in 
schizophrenia (e.g., Rentrop et al., 2010; Vinogradov, Poole, Willis-Shore, Ober & Shenaut, 
1998) and in high risk samples (Cole, Weinberger & Dickinson, 2011; Y. Shin et al., 2013), we 
are aware of only one other study that assessed schizotypy-related variance in RT 
variability. Schmidt-Hansen and Honey (2009) found that RT variability in a 2-back WMC task 
predicted positive schizotypy more strongly than either disorganized or negative dimensions. 
Together, these findings suggest that positive symptoms reflect a general dysregulation of 
cognitive and affective functioning (e.g., Barrantes-Vidal et al., 2013; Cicero & Kerns, 
2010; Kerns, 2005; Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015). Our CoV findings suggest that future 
research on executive control and schizotypy should take a latent-variable approach to 
intraindividual variability and assessing its links to different symptoms. 
WMC, Attention Restraint, and Schizotypy: Why So Little Covariation? 
Contrary to our expectations, but in line with the inconclusive literature on schizotypy and 
executive control, neither WMC nor restraint constructs broadly predicted schizotypy. Attention 
restraint (and the common variance across executive constructs in our bifactor model, where 
restraint tasks had the strongest loadings) correlated modestly with only paranoid schizotypy. 
Paranoia has been neglected by researchers investigating cognitive or neuropsychological 
correlates of schizotypy, perhaps because paranoid schizophrenia tends to not be associated with 
cognitive deficits (see Zalewski, Johnson-Selfridge, Ohriner, Zarrella, & Seltzer, 1998). Our 
finding that restraint failures predict paranoid thinking seems consistent with claims that 
delusions follow from failures to selectively filter preconscious thoughts from consciousness 
(e.g., Frith, 1979) or from the assignment of significance (e.g., Kapur, 2003), but we did not 
predict the restraint-paranoia association to be especially robust, and so we should probably not 
speculate too deeply about this intriguing finding until it is independently replicated. 
But what should we make of the failures of WMC, attention restraint, or common executive-
attention variance to predict schizotypy more comprehensively? Given the strengths of the 
present study in terms of sample size, statistical power, construct coverage, and construct 
measurement, we suggest that subclinical manifestations of schizotypy are not generally 
associated with significant executive-control disruptions. If we are correct, it should also follow 
that, either (a) the executive deficits typically seen in schizophrenia represent a consequence of 
the disease rather than a cause or risk factor, or (b) declines in executive capabilities appear only 
far along the schizotypy spectrum, and so they scarcely precede—or may precipitate—the 
transition to diagnosable psychosis. In the former case, we would not expect to generally find 
correlations between schizotypy and executive performance; in the latter case, we would only 
expect executive-schizotypy correlations to arise in “ultra high-risk” groups (e.g., McGorry, 
Yung, & Phillips, 2003; Yung et al., 1998) and not from most community or university samples. 
Indeed, a clear limitation of our empirical approach is that our subjects were university students, 
healthy and cognitively intact enough to begin pursuit of a bachelor’s degree. They thus provided 
us with a somewhat conservative test of cognition-schizotypy associations. Subjects recruited 
from the community may have shown more extreme schizotypy scores and more (and more 
strongly associated) cognitive dysfunction. At the same time, college-aged adults are just 
entering the window of greatest risk for developing schizophrenia, many published studies on 
executive functions and schizotypy have tested university samples, and ours came from a 
comprehensive state university with a diverse student body (UNCG is a Minority-Serving 
Institution for African Americans) and modest admissions criteria (60% of first-year applicants 
were accepted for Fall, 2012; UNCG Fact Book, 2012–2013, downloaded July, 2015 
from http://ire.uncg.edu/pages/factbook/default.asp?T2012-13), making it more like a 
community sample than are many university populations. 
Another limitation, shared with other studies, is in the psychometric assessment of schizotypy. 
Despite our questionnaires’ well-established validity (e.g., Chapman et al., 1994; Kwapil, 1998), 
they do not tap broadly or deeply into schizotypy’s more cognitive features. Indeed, those that do 
ask about cognitive symptoms may not capture them effectively. Negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia, for example, such as diminished speech, language, and thought, tend not to appear 
on negative schizotypy scales, which instead emphasize social, emotional, and motivational 
functioning. And even if they did, it is not clear that someone suffering from those cognitive 
symptoms would have the insight to report them accurately. 
We were not surprised by the strong correlation between positive and paranoid schizotypy, given 
that clinical and subclinical paranoia share unrealistic thoughts and beliefs with positive 
schizotypy, but their strong correlations with disorganized schizotypy raises concerns about its 
psychometric assessment. For example, measures purporting to assess disorganization may, in 
fact, be tapping odd speech and behavior that is secondary to positive schizotypy, rather than 
disruptions in the form and regulation of thought (Gross et al., 2014). Furthermore, self-report 
measures of disorganization correlate strongly with neuroticism (as do other cognitive-failure 
questionnaires; e.g., Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Parkes, 1982; Matthews, Coyle, & Craig, 
1990; Wilhelm, Witthöft, & Schipolowski, 2010), which is problematic because the nomological 
network around disorganization does not include affective dysregulation and distress (Gross et 
al., 2014). In relatively healthy young adults, then, self-reported difficulties in attention, 
memory, speech, and thought may tell us as much about people’s overall psychological 
adjustment and sense of well-being as they do about significant or specific cognitive 
impairments. 
We suggest, then, that future investigations into the cognitive correlates of schizotypy should not 
only use large samples of subjects and measures, as we did. They should also consider 
alternative means by which to assess schizotypy’s more cognitive dimensions, perhaps via 
reports from close others or through corroboration from performance records from school or 
work settings. In the face of our largely null results—aside from TUT and CoV findings—we 
suggest that the burden of proof is on those claiming significant cognitive components to normal 
variation in schizotypy. 
The Structure of Executive Control: Unity and Diversity 
The variance shared, versus not shared, by our cognitive measures clarifies the nomological 
network for the frequently invoked—but gravely underspecified—construct of executive control. 
Here we focus our discussion on (a) WMC’s associations with attention restraint, constraint, and 
TUTs, and (b) executive contributions to mind-wandering propensity and intraindividual 
variability in task performance. 
Attention Restraint and Constraint, and Their Links to WMC 
Consistent with Friedman and Miyake (2004), we found a robust association between attention 
restraint and constraint abilities—as well as both with WMC. Our estimate of the restraint-
constraint correlation (.60) was similar to theirs (.68), but their study was underpowered to 
statistically distinguish them. We found that, although people who were better at overriding 
dominant-but-wrong responses in antisaccade, SART, and Stroop tasks were also generally 
better at focusing on target stimuli presented amid distractors in flanker tasks, these skills were 
distinguishable and not identical. Moreover, restraint failures were considerably more strongly 
correlated with WMC than were constraint failures. 
Why? Perhaps WMC correlated more weakly with constraint than restraint due to measurement 
problems: We assessed constraint ability exclusively with flanker tasks. Even though we varied 
their stimuli, array properties, responses, and dependent measures, the constraint factor had a 
narrower psychometric bandwidth (Cronbach, 1990) than did restraint. That is, the restraint tasks 
(antisaccade, SART, number and spatial Stroop) were diverse in structural and surface 
characteristics and so shared less method variance than did the flanker tasks. Shared method 
variance should drive down the constraint factor’s association with other constructs that do not 
share that method. To address this possibility, post hoc, we modeled restraint with only the 
antisaccade tasks (letter and arrow), thus narrowing its bandwidth to nearly identical measures 
(but those with the highest restraint loadings). We modeled constraint with two more dissimilar 
(but highest loading) tasks, conditional accuracy flanker (S-R and S-S conditions) and masked 
flanker (S-R and S-S), thus providing a wider bandwidth for constraint than restraint. In a good-
fitting CFA that included WMC and TUTs (CFI and TLI > .93; SRMR and RMSEA < .05), the 
2-indicator restraint factor and 4-indicator constraint factor correlated strongly, and similarly to 
that in the full-construct model (.63). Again, however, restraint was more closely associated with 
WMC (-.62) than was constraint (−.35), suggesting that method variance was not responsible for 
constraint’s weaker association with WMC. 
Provisionally, then, we propose that WMC has more in common with attention restraint than 
constraint because restraint tasks tap more strongly into maintenance mechanisms than do 
constraint tasks, particularly those that keep current task goals accessible. Restraint tasks are 
especially challenging because they ask subjects to engage a task goal that conflicts strongly with 
habit, while providing little contextual support for that unusual goal (Kane et al., 2001; Kane & 
Engle, 2003). In the Stroop task, particularly one that presents mostly congruent trials, subjects 
must endogenously regulate their cognition and behavior by maintaining access to the novel task 
goal, which biases responding in the demanded direction. If subjects momentarily forget that, 
in this context, they should ignore what a word says or look away from a salient visual cue, they 
will make overt errors or very slow “just-in-time” responses on conflict trials (e.g., Kane & 
Engle, 2003; McVay & Kane, 2012a; Unsworth et al., 2004, 2010; Unsworth, Redick, et al., 
2012). So, in addition to presenting subjects with conflict between target and nontarget stimuli, 
restraint tasks also challenge subjects to maintain enough accessibility to a nondominant task set 
to allow quick reactions to that conflict (for related arguments about “inhibition” tasks, 
see Miyake & Friedman, 2012). 
Constraint tasks like the flanker, in contrast, do not particularly test subjects’ ability to maintain 
task goals, as they present little conflict with prepotent behaviors. There is nothing in a flanker 
display that draws one’s attention away from the target array, or that otherwise derails one from 
the goal of classifying the target while ignoring distractors. Although attention may be initially 
captured by the full extent of the flanker-dominating array (e.g., Eriksen & St. James, 
1986; Gratton, Coles, Sirevaag, Eriksen, & Donchin, 1988; Heitz & Engle, 2007), the main 
challenge is not in maintaining the correct task set, but rather in combatting the competition from 
flankers in selecting the target or the response. Constraint and restraint tasks thus have in 
common the requirement to overcome acute conflict in encoding or responding to stimuli. 
Restraint tasks, however, also primarily tax goal-maintenance mechanisms that likely overlap 
with those involved in working memory maintenance more generally. 
Mind-Wandering Variation and Covariation 
Despite our assessing TUT rates across different kinds of tasks, they formed a coherent latent 
variable, indicating a trait-like vulnerability to off-task thought (see also Grodsky & Giambra, 
1990; McVay & Kane, 2012b; Mrazek et al., 2012; Unsworth, 2015; Unsworth & McMillan, 
2014). We also found, however, that correlations between TUT rates were highest for 
assessments within the same experimental session (separated by 15–60 min) than for those 
across sessions (separated by days or weeks). This same-session increase in correlations suggests 
state-like, in addition to trait-like, variation in mind-wandering propensity, perhaps reflecting the 
influence of current goals, concerns, and mood in providing fodder for TUTs (e.g., Franklin et 
al., 2013; Klinger, 2013; McVay & Kane, 2013; Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 
2009). 
TUT rate correlated well with other executive constructs (including constraint, 
contradicting Forster & Lavie, 2014), so we argue that it reflects—in part—control processes 
that operate to keep thoughts on-task (McVay & Kane, 2010; Kane & McVay, 2012). At the 
same time, TUTs correlated more strongly with attention restraint and constraint than with 
WMC. An uninteresting explanation for this is that we measured TUTs during some of the 
restraint and constraint tasks, so they shared method and error variance that drove their 
correlations higher. We can rule out this possibility through a post hoc model that eliminates 
restraint and constraint performance measures that included thought probes. Here, we modeled 
attention restraint with only the two antisaccade tasks plus spatial Stroop (dropping the probed 
SART and number Stroop tasks), and modeled constraint with only the S-R and S-S measures 
from conditional accuracy and masked flanker tasks (dropping the probed arrow and letter 
flanker tasks); the model fit with CFI and TLI > .92 and RMSEA and SRMR < .05. TUT 
correlations were similar to those in our original model, and the WMC-TUT correlation of −.18 
was again numerically smaller than those for restraint-TUT (.28) and constraint-TUT (.35). A 
better explanation for our findings, then, is that memory-related variance shared by WMC tasks 
is less associated with mind-wandering vulnerability than is the attention-control-related variance 
that is tapped more fully by “simpler” attention tasks of restraint and constraint. 
Pragmatically, then, we recommend that investigators aiming to explore executive-task 
covariation with mind wandering use tasks of attention restraint or constraint rather than (or in 
addition to) WMC. Moreover, given the weak correlations among individual measures of 
executive control and TUTs (see also McVay & Kane, 2012b; Randall et al., 2014), we suggest 
that researchers use multiple assessments of control and TUTs to allow latent-variable methods. 
TUT vulnerability is only affected in part, however, by executive control abilities: Our bifactor 
models indicated that TUT rates share substantial variance that is not accounted for by other 
executive abilities (and this residual TUT variance predicted positive, disorganized, and paranoid 
schizotypy). We think it most likely that noncognitive influences related to personality, 
motivation, mood, or current concerns also drive variation in mind-wandering (e.g., Klinger, 
2013; Seli et al., 2015; Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudberry, & Obonsawin, 2007; Zhiyan & Singer, 
1997). 
RT Variability as an Executive Construct 
Several literatures converge on the idea that intraindividual variation in performance tells us 
important things about people (for a review, see MacDonald, Nyberg, & Bäckman, 2006), such 
as their intelligence (e.g., Larson & Alderton, 1990; Ratcliff, Schmiedek, & McKoon, 2008), age 
(e.g., Li et al., 2004; Rabbitt, Osman, Moore, & Stollery, 2001), and risk or diagnostic status for 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder or dementia (e.g., Bidwell, Willcutt, DeFries, & 
Pennington, 2007; Castellanos, Sonuga-Barke, Milham, & Tannock, 2006; Christensen et al., 
2005; Murtha, Cismaru, Waechter, & Chertkow, 2002; Tamm et al., 2012). Such findings 
indicate that performance instability reflects a stable, trait-like individual difference, often 
indicated by RT variability, as in the current study. 
We aimed to extend our prior findings that relied on individual tasks to assess TUTs and RT 
variability (McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012a), as well as Unsworth’s (2015) findings that CoV 
measured across numerous executive tasks yielded a latent variable that correlated strongly with 
WMC and TUTs. Because Unsworth measured CoV across trials from tasks that presented many 
conflict-inducing trials, we wanted to be sure that his findings didn’t result from CoV measures 
being contaminated by attention restraint and constraint processes. If large CoV scores reflect a 
general executive failure to consistently maintain optimal task focus (or implementation of task 
sets), then those momentary failures should be detectable in RTs for trials that do not elicit 
conflict. In fact, consistent with the McVay-Kane findings from nonconflict “go” trials in the 
SART, CoV measured from nonconflict trials reflected a single factor associated with other 
executive abilities. Despite the measurement differences, our key findings 
complemented Unsworth (2015): RT CoV correlated with WMC (see also Schmiedek et al., 
2007; Unsworth et al., 2010, 2012), with TUT rate (see also Bastian & Sackur, 2013; Seli et al., 
2013), and with attention restraint failure. 
However, we question Unsworth’s (2015) conclusion that CoV in attention-control tasks is 
fundamentally different from CoV in other tasks. His Study 1 and 2 clearly showed a distinction 
between CoV from attention-control and lexical-decision tasks, but intraindividual variation in 
lexical decision seems likely to be driven as much by vocabulary knowledge and the particular 
stimuli presented on each trial as by fluctuations in task-focused thought or implementation of 
task set. Thus, we suspect that lexical-decision tasks reflect more of a special case than do 
attention-control tasks. We suggest that CoV measured across simple RT tasks, or choice RT 
tasks that do not draw heavily on crystallized knowledge, will produce results similar to ours 
from neutral and congruent trials from executive-control tasks. Indeed, Schmiedek et al. 
(2007) assessed RT variability across a large number of relatively simple choice-RT tasks and it 
correlated strongly with WMC; moreover, ADHD-related increases in RT variability are evident 
over a wide range of task types (for a review, see Kuntsi & Klein, 2012). Our view, then, is that 
intraindividual fluctuations in RT within simple tasks are partly a reflection of attention-control 
mechanisms, and that individual differences in these fluctuations provide a useful and underused 
marker of executive control. We further recommend that RT CoV and mind wandering 
vulnerability, both indicative of intraindividual variation in attentional focus, be explored further 
in testing theories about the cognitive components of schizotypal traits. 
Footnotes 
1 Subjects completed two additional cognitive tasks that we do not analyze here. These 
divergent-thinking tests of creativity were conducted to address separate questions, under a 
different order of authorship, and so will be reported in a subsequent article. 
2 Given the high correlations among positive, disorganized, and paranoid schizotypy factors, we 
computed a post hoc, two-factor CFA in which the positive, disorganized, and paranoid scales 
loaded on a single “positive” factor (and the original negative schizotypy factor was again 
modeled). This model had inadequate fit, and descriptively poorer fit than the original four-factor 
model, χ2(154) = 861.74, χ2/df = 5.60, CFI = .860, TLI = .827, SRMR = .076, RMSEA = .093 
(90% CI = .087, .099). Furthermore, we examined the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to formally compare the two- and four-factor models (note 
that these indices penalize more complex models with smaller values indicating better fit). Both 
indicated that the original four-factor model (AIC = 41181.38, BIC = 41527.94) had better fit 
than the two-factor model (AIC = 41744.14, BIC = 42069.31). 
3 Because our constraint tasks were designed to elicit S-R conflict, S-S conflict, or both, we also 
tested a 5-factor model that distinguished S-R constraint from S-S constraint. However, this 
model did not fit the data, χ2(284) = 646.57, χ2/df = 2.28, CFI = .861, TLI = .841, SRMR = .058, 




Addington, J., Addington, D., & Maticka-Tyndale, E. (1991). Cognitive functioning and positive 
and negative symptoms in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 5, 123–134. 10.1016/0920-
9964(91)90039-T 
Altamirano, L. J., Miyake, A., & Whitmer, A. J. (2010). When mental inflexibility facilitates 
executive control: Beneficial side effects of ruminative tendencies on goal 
maintenance. Psychological Science, 21, 1377–1382. 10.1177/0956797610381505 
Andreasen, N. C. (1999). A unitary model of schizophrenia: Bleuler’s fragmented “phrene” as 
schizencephaly. Archives of General Psychiatry, 56, 781–793. 
Arndt, S., Alliger, R. J., & Andreasen, N. C. (1991). The distinction of positive and negative 
symptoms. The failure of a two-dimensional model. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 158, 317–
322. 10.1192/bjp.158.3.317 
Avons, S. E., Nunn, J. A., Chan, L., & Armstrong, H. (2003). Executive function assessed by 
memory updating and random generation in schizotypal individuals. Psychiatry Research, 120, 
145–154. 10.1016/S0165-1781(03)00174-4 
Baddeley, A. D. (1986). Working memory. London, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Barch, D. M. (2005). The cognitive neuroscience of schizophrenia. Annual Review of Clinical 
Psychology, 1, 321–353. 10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.1.102803.143959 
Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., Braver, T. S., Sabb, F. W., MacDonald, A., III, Noll, D. C., & 
Cohen, J. D. (2001). Selective deficits in prefrontal cortex function in medication-naive patients 
with schizophrenia. Archives of General Psychiatry, 58, 280–288. 10.1001/archpsyc.58.3.280 
Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., MacDonald, A. W., III, Braver, T. S., & Cohen, J. D. (2003). 
Context-processing deficits in schizophrenia: Diagnostic specificity, 4-week course, and 
relationships to clinical symptoms. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 112, 132–143. 
Barch, D. M., & Ceaser, A. (2012). Cognition in schizophrenia: Core psychological and neural 
mechanisms. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16, 27–34. 10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.015 
Barrantes-Vidal, N., Chun, C., Myin-Germeys, I., & Kwapil, T. R. (2013). Psychometric 
schizotypy predicts psychotic-like, paranoid, and negative symptoms in daily life. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 122, 1077–1087. 10.1037/a0034793 
Bastian, M., & Sackur, J. (2013). Mind wandering at the fingertips: Automatic parsing of 
subjective states based on response time variability. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 573. 
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00573 
Beech, A., Baylis, G. C., Smithson, P., & Claridge, G. (1989). Individual differences in 
schizotypy as reflected in measures of cognitive inhibition. British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 28, 117–129. 10.1111/j.2044-8260.1989.tb00822.x 
Bergida, H., & Lenzenweger, M. F. (2006). Schizotypy and sustained attention: Confirming 
evidence from an adult community sample. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 115, 545–551. 
Bidwell, L. C., Willcutt, E. G., Defries, J. C., & Pennington, B. F. (2007). Testing for 
neuropsychological endophenotypes in siblings discordant for attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder. Biological Psychiatry, 62, 991–998. 10.1016/j.biopsych.2007.04.003 
Bilder, R. M., Mukherjee, S., Rieder, R. O., & Pandurangi, A. K. (1985). Symptomatic and 
neuropsychological components of defect states. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 11, 409–419. 
10.1093/schbul/11.3.409 
Blanchard, J. J., Collins, L. M., Aghevli, M., Leung, W. W., & Cohen, A. S. (2011). Social 
anhedonia and schizotypy in a community sample: The Maryland longitudinal study of 
schizotypy. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 37, 587–602. 10.1093/schbul/sbp107 
Braver, T. S., Gray, J. R., & Burgess, G. C. (2007). Explaining the many varieties of working 
memory variation: Dual mechanisms of cognitive control. In A. R. A.Conway, C.Jarrold, M. 
J.Kane, A.Miyake, & J. N.Towse (Eds.), Variation in working memory (pp. 76–106). New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press. 
Broadbent, D. E., Cooper, P. F., FitzGerald, P., & Parkes, K. R. (1982). The cognitive failures 
questionnaire (CFQ) and its correlates. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 21, 1–16. 
10.1111/j.2044-8260.1982.tb01421.x 
Broadway, J. M., & Engle, R. W. (2010). Validating running memory span: Measurement of 
working memory capacity and links with fluid intelligence. Behavior Research Methods, 42, 
563–570. 10.3758/BRM.42.2.563 
Carroll, J. B. (1993). Human cognitive abilities: A survey of factor-analytic studies. New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9780511571312 
Castellanos, F. X., Sonuga-Barke, E. J. S., Milham, M. P., & Tannock, R. (2006). Characterizing 
cognition in ADHD: Beyond executive dysfunction. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 117–123. 
10.1016/j.tics.2006.01.011 
Chan, R. C. K., Wang, Y., Yan, C., Song, L.-L., Wang, Y.-N., Shi, Y.-F., . . .Cheung, E. F. C. 
(2011). Contribution of specific cognitive dysfunction to people with schizotypal 
personality. Psychiatry Research, 186, 71–75. 10.1016/j.psychres.2010.06.016 
Chan, R. C. K., Yan, C., Qing, Y.-H., Wang, Y., Wang, Y.-N., Ma, Z., . . .Yu, X. (2011). 
Subjective awareness of everyday dysexecutive behavior precedes ‘objective’ executive 
problems in schizotypy: A replication and extension study. Psychiatry Research, 185, 340–346. 
10.1016/j.psychres.2010.06.009 
Chapman, L. J., & Chapman, J. P. (1983). Infrequency scale. Unpublished test (copies available 
from T. R. Kwapil, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, P. 
O. Box 26170, Greensboro, NC, 27402–6170). 
Chapman, L. J., Chapman, J. P., Kwapil, T. R., Eckblad, M., & Zinser, M. C. (1994). Putatively 
psychosis-prone subjects 10 years later. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 103, 171–183. 
10.1037/0021-843X.103.2.171 
Chapman, L. J., Chapman, J. P., & Raulin, M. L. (1976). Scales for physical and social 
anhedonia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 85, 374–382. 10.1037/0021-843X.85.4.374 
Chapman, L. J., Chapman, J. P., & Raulin, M. L. (1978). Body-image aberration in 
Schizophrenia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 399–407. 10.1037/0021-843X.87.4.399 
Chen, W. J., Hsiao, C. K., & Lin, C. C. H. (1997). Schizotypy in community samples: The three-
factor structure and correlation with sustained attention. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 106, 
649–654. 10.1037/0021-843X.106.4.649 
Christensen, H., Dear, K. B. G., Anstey, K. J., Parslow, R. A., Sachdev, P., & Jorm, A. F. (2005). 
Within-occasion intraindividual variability and preclinical diagnostic status: Is intraindividual 
variability an indicator of mild cognitive impairment?Neuropsychology, 19, 309–317. 
10.1037/0894-4105.19.3.309 
Christoff, K., Gordon, A. M., Smallwood, J., Smith, R., & Schooler, J. W. (2009). Experience 
sampling during fMRI reveals default network and executive system contributions to mind 
wandering. PNAS Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 106, 8719–8724. 10.1073/pnas.0900234106 
Chuderski, A. (2014). How well can storage capacity, executive control, and fluid reasoning 
explain insight problem solving. Intelligence, 46, 258–270. 10.1016/j.intell.2014.07.010 
Chuderski, A., Taraday, M., Nęcka, E., & Smoleń, T. (2012). Storage capacity explains fluid 
intelligence but executive control does not. Intelligence, 40, 278–295. 
10.1016/j.intell.2012.02.010 
Chun, C. A., Minor, K. S., & Cohen, A. S. (2013). Neurocognition in psychometrically defined 
college schizotypy samples: We are NOT measuring the “right stuff.”Journal of the 
International Neuropsychological Society, 19, 324–337. 10.1017/S135561771200152X 
Cicero, D. C., & Kerns, J. G. (2010). Can disorganized and positive schizotypy be discriminated 
from dissociation?Journal of Personality, 78, 1239–1270. 
Cimino, M., & Haywood, M. (2008). Inhibition and facilitation in schizotypy. Journal of 
Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 30, 187–198. 10.1080/13803390701336866 
Coffman, D. L., & MacCallum, R. C. (2005). Using parcels to convert path analysis models into 
latent variable models. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 40, 235–259. 
10.1207/s15327906mbr4002_4 
Cole, V. T., Weinberger, D. R., & Dickinson, D. (2011). Intra-individual variability across 
neuropsychological tasks in schizophrenia: A comparison of patients, their siblings, and healthy 
controls. Schizophrenia Research, 129, 91–93. 10.1016/j.schres.2011.03.007 
Coleman, M. J., Levy, D. L., Lenzenweger, M. F., & Holzman, P. S. (1996). Thought disorder, 
perceptual aberrations, and schizotypy. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 105, 469–473. 
10.1037/0021-843X.105.3.469 
Colom, R., Abad, F. J., Quiroga, M. A., Shih, P. C., & Flores-Mendoza, C. (2008). Working 
memory and intelligence are highly related constructs, but why?Intelligence, 36, 584–606. 
Conway, A. R. A., Cowan, N., & Bunting, M. F. (2001). The cocktail party phenomenon 
revisited: The importance of working memory capacity. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8, 
331–335. 10.3758/BF03196169 
Conway, A. R. A., & Engle, R. W. (1994). Working memory and retrieval: A resource-
dependent inhibition model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 123, 354–373. 
10.1037/0096-3445.123.4.354 
Conway, A. R. A., Kane, M. J., Bunting, M. F., Hambrick, D. Z., Wilhelm, O., & Engle, R. W. 
(2005). Working memory span tasks: A methodological review and user’s guide. Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review, 12, 769–786. 10.3758/BF03196772 
Coyle, T. R. (2003). A review of the worst performance rule: Evidence, theory, and alternative 
hypotheses. Intelligence, 31, 567–587. 10.1016/S0160-2896(03)00054-0 
Cronbach, L. J. (1990). Essentials of psychological testing (5th ed.). New York, NY: Harper & 
Row. 
Daly, M. P., Afroz, S., & Walder, D. J. (2012). Schizotypal traits and neurocognitive functioning 
among nonclinical young adults. Psychiatry Research, 200, 635–640. 
10.1016/j.psychres.2012.06.016 
Daneman, M., & Carpenter, P. A. (1980). Individual differences in working memory and 
reading. Journal of Verbal Learning & Verbal Behavior, 19, 450–466. 10.1016/S0022-
5371(80)90312-6 
Dang, C.-P., Braeken, J., Colom, R., Ferrer, E., & Liu, C. (2014). Why is working memory 
related to intelligence? Different contributions from storage and processing. Memory, 22, 426–
441. 10.1080/09658211.2013.797471 
Dinn, W. M., Harris, C. L., Aycicegi, A., Greene, P., & Andover, M. S. (2002). Positive and 
negative schizotypy in a student sample: Neurocognitive and clinical correlates. Schizophrenia 
Research, 56, 171–185. 10.1016/S0920-9964(01)00230-4 
Draheim, C., Hicks, K. L., & Engle, R. W. (2016). Combining reaction time and accuracy: The 
relationship between working memory capacity and task switching as a case 
example. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11, 133–155. 10.1177/1745691615596990 
Eckblad, M., & Chapman, L. J. (1983). Magical ideation as an indicator of schizotypy. Journal 
of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 51, 215–225. 10.1037/0022-006X.51.2.215 
Eckblad, M. L., Chapman, L. J., Chapman, J. P., & Mishlove, M. (1982). The revised Social 
Anhedonia Scale. Unpublished test (copies available from T. R. Kwapil, Department of 
Psychology, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, P. O. Box 26170, Greensboro, NC, 
27402–6170). 
Enders, C. K. (2010). Applied missing data analysis. New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Engle, R. W., Tuholski, S. W., Laughlin, J. E., & Conway, A. R. A. (1999). Working memory, 
short-term memory, and general fluid intelligence: A latent-variable approach. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 128, 309–331. 10.1037/0096-3445.128.3.309 
Eriksen, C. W., & St. James, J. D. (1986). Visual attention within and around the field of focal 
attention: A zoom lens model. Perception & Psychophysics, 40, 225–240. 10.3758/BF03211502 
Forster, S., & Lavie, N. (2014). Distracted by your mind? Individual differences in distractibility 
predict mind wandering. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 40, 251–260. 10.1037/a0034108 
Franklin, M. S., Mrazek, M. D., Anderson, C. L., Smallwood, J., Kingstone, A., & Schooler, J. 
W. (2013). The silver lining of a mind in the clouds: Interesting musings are associated with 
positive mood while mind-wandering. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 583. 
Freeman, D., Garety, P. A., Bebbington, P. E., Smith, B., Rollinson, R., Fowler, D., . . .Dunn, G. 
(2005). Psychological investigation of the structure of paranoia in a non-clinical population. The 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 186, 427–435. 10.1192/bjp.186.5.427 
Friedman, N. P., & Miyake, A. (2004). The relations among inhibition and interference control 
functions: A latent-variable analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 101–
135. 10.1037/0096-3445.133.1.101 
Friedman, N. P., Miyake, A., Robinson, J. L., & Hewitt, J. K. (2011). Developmental trajectories 
in toddler’s self-restraint predict individual differences in executive functions 14 years later: A 
behavioral genetic analysis. Developmental Psychology, 47, 1410–1430. 
Friedman, N. P., Miyake, A., Young, S. E., Defries, J. C., Corley, R. P., & Hewitt, J. K. (2008). 
Individual differences in executive functions are almost entirely genetic in origin. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 137, 201–225. 10.1037/0096-3445.137.2.201 
Frith, C. D. (1979). Consciousness, information processing and schizophrenia. The British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 134, 225–235. 10.1192/bjp.134.3.225 
Fuggetta, G., Bennett, M. A., Duke, P. A., & Young, A. M. (2014). Quantitative 
electroencephalography as a biomarker for proneness toward developing 
psychosis. Schizophrenia Research, 153, 68–77. 10.1016/j.schres.2014.01.021 
Giambra, L. M. (1989). Task-unrelated-thought frequency as a function of age: A laboratory 
study. Psychology and Aging, 4, 136–143. 10.1037/0882-7974.4.2.136 
Gooding, D. C. (1999). Antisaccade task performance in questionnaire-identified 
schizotypes. Schizophrenia Research, 35, 157–166. 10.1016/S0920-9964(98)00120-0 
Gooding, D. C., Matts, C. W., & Rollmann, E. A. (2006). Sustained attention deficits in relation 
to psychometrically identified schizotypy: Evaluating a potential endophenotypic 
marker. Schizophrenia Research, 82, 27–37. 10.1016/j.schres.2005.11.015 
Gooding, D. C., & Tallent, K. A. (2003). Spatial, object, and affective working memory in social 
anhedonia: An exploratory study. Schizophrenia Research, 63, 247–260. 10.1016/S0920-
9964(02)00326-2 
Gooding, D. C., Tallent, K. A., & Hegyi, J. V. (2001). Cognitive slippage in schizotypic 
individuals. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 189, 750–756. 10.1097/00005053-
200111000-00004 
Gooding, D. C., Tallent, K. A., & Matts, C. W. (2005). Clinical status of at-risk individuals 5 
years later: Further validation of the psychometric high-risk strategy. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 114, 170–175. 10.1037/0021-843X.114.1.170 
Gottesman, I. I. (1991). Schizophrenia genesis: The origins of madness. San Francisco, CA: 
Freeman. 
Gratton, G., Coles, M. G. H., Sirevaag, E. J., Eriksen, C. W., & Donchin, E. (1988). Pre- and 
poststimulus activation of response channels: A psychophysiological analysis. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 14, 331–344. 10.1037/0096-
1523.14.3.331 
Grodsky, A., & Giambra, L. M. (1990). The consistency across vigilance and reading tasks of 
individual differences in the occurrence of task-unrelated and task-related images and 
thoughts. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 10, 39–52. 10.2190/6QG5-CXVV-4XUR-
7P3K 
Gross, G. M., Mellin, J., Silvia, P. J., Barrantes-Vidal, N., & Kwapil, T. R. (2014). Comparing 
the factor structure of the Wisconsin Schizotypy Scales and the Schizotypal Personality 
Questionnaire. Personality Disorders, 5, 397–405. 10.1037/per0000090 
Gross, G. M., Silvia, P. J., Barrantes-Vidal, N., & Kwapil, T. R. (2012). Psychometric properties 
and validity of short forms of the Wisconsin Schizotypy Scales in two large 
samples. Schizophrenia Research, 134, 267–272. 10.1016/j.schres.2011.11.032 
Gustafsson, J. E. (1984). A unifying model for the structure of intellectual 
abilities. Intelligence, 8, 179–203. 10.1016/0160-2896(84)90008-4 
Harvey, P. D., Koren, D., Reichenberg, A., & Bowie, C. R. (2006). Negative symptoms and 
cognitive deficits: What is the nature of their relationship?Schizophrenia Bulletin, 32, 250–258. 
10.1093/schbul/sbj011 
Hasher, L., Lustig, C., & Zacks, R. T. (2007). Inhibitory mechanisms and the control of 
attention. In A. R. A.Conway, C.Jarrold, M. J.Kane, A.Miyake, & J. N.Towse (Eds.), Variation 
in working memory (pp. 227–249). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Heinrichs, R. W., & Zakzanis, K. K. (1998). Neurocognitive deficit in schizophrenia: A 
quantitative review of the evidence. Neuropsychology, 12, 426–445. 10.1037/0894-
4105.12.3.426 
Heitz, R. P., & Engle, R. W. (2007). Focusing the spotlight: Individual differences in visual 
attention control. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 136, 217–240. 10.1037/0096-
3445.136.2.217 
Höfer, I., Della Casa, V., & Feldon, J. (1999). The interaction between schizotypy and latent 
inhibition: Modulation by experimental parameters. Personality and Individual Differences, 26, 
1075–1088. 10.1016/S0191-8869(98)00211-6 
Horn, J. L. (1968). Organization of abilities and the development of intelligence. Psychological 
Review, 75, 242–259. 10.1037/h0025662 
Horton, L. E., Barrantes-Vidal, N., Silvia, P. J., & Kwapil, T. R. (2014). Worries about being 
judged versus being harmed: Disentangling the association of social anxiety and paranoia with 
schizotypy. PLoS ONE, 9, e96269. 10.1371/journal.pone.0096269 
Iati, C. A. (2012). Working memory and executive functioning impairment as endophenotypes of 
schizophrenia (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Indiana State University, Terra Haute, IN. 
Kaczorowski, J. A., Barrantes-Vidal, N., & Kwapil, T. R. (2009). Neurological soft signs in 
psychometrically identified schizotypy. Schizophrenia Research, 115, 293–302. 
10.1016/j.schres.2009.06.018 
Kane, M. J., Bleckley, M. K., Conway, A. R. A., & Engle, R. W. (2001). A controlled-attention 
view of working-memory capacity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 130, 169–
183. 10.1037/0096-3445.130.2.169 
Kane, M. J., Brown, L. H., McVay, J. C., Silvia, P. J., Myin-Germeys, I., & Kwapil, T. R. 
(2007). For whom the mind wanders, and when: An experience-sampling study of working 
memory and executive control in daily life. Psychological Science, 18, 614–621. 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2007.01948.x 
Kane, M. J., Conway, A. R. A., Hambrick, D. Z., & Engle, R. W. (2007). Variation in working 
memory as variation in executive attention and control. In A. R. A.Conway, C.Jarrold, M. 
J.Kane, A.Miyake, & J. N.Towse (Eds.), Variation in working memory (pp. 21–48). New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press. 
Kane, M. J., & Engle, R. W. (2003). Working-memory capacity and the control of attention: The 
contributions of goal neglect, response competition, and task set to Stroop interference. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: General, 132, 47–70. 10.1037/0096-3445.132.1.47 
Kane, M. J., Hambrick, D. Z., Tuholski, S. W., Wilhelm, O., Payne, T. W., & Engle, R. W. 
(2004). The generality of working memory capacity: A latent-variable approach to verbal and 
visuospatial memory span and reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 
189–217. 10.1037/0096-3445.133.2.189 
Kane, M. J., & McVay, J. C. (2012). What mind wandering reveals about executive-control 
abilities and failures. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21, 348–354. 
10.1177/0963721412454875 
Kapur, S. (2003). Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: A framework linking biology, 
phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 160, 
13–23. 10.1176/appi.ajp.160.1.13 
Kapur, S., Mizrahi, R., & Li, M. (2005). From dopamine to salience to psychosis—Linking 
biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. Schizophrenia Research, 79, 59–68. 
10.1016/j.schres.2005.01.003 
Kerns, J. G. (2005). Positive schizotypy and emotion processing. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 114, 392–401. 10.1037/0021-843X.114.3.392 
Kerns, J. G. (2006). Schizotypy facets, cognitive control, and emotion. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 115, 418–427. 10.1037/0021-843X.115.3.418 
Kerns, J. G., & Becker, T. M. (2008). Communication disturbances, working memory, and 
emotion in people with elevated disorganized schizotypy. Schizophrenia Research, 100, 172–
180. 10.1016/j.schres.2007.11.005 
Keye, D., Wilhelm, O., Oberauer, K., & Stürmer, B. (2013). Individual differences in response 
conflict adaptations. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 947. 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00947 
Keye, D., Wilhelm, O., Oberauer, K., & van Ravenzwaaij, D. (2009). Individual differences in 
conflict-monitoring: Testing means and covariance hypothesis about the Simon and the Eriksen 
Flanker task. Psychological Research, 73, 762–776. 10.1007/s00426-008-0188-9 
Klinger, E. (1999). Thought flow: Properties and mechanisms underlying shifts in content. In J. 
A.Singer & P.Salovey (Eds.), At play in the fields of consciousness: Essays in honor of Jerome 
L. Singer (pp. 29–50). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Klinger, E. (2013). Goal commitments and the content of thoughts and dreams: Basic 
principles. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 415. 
Kornblum, S., Hasbroucq, T., & Osman, A. (1990). Dimensional overlap: Cognitive basis for 
stimulus-response compatibility—A model and taxonomy. Psychological Review, 97, 253–270. 
10.1037/0033-295X.97.2.253 
Koychev, I., El-Deredy, W., Haenschel, C., & Deakin, J. F. W. (2010). Visual information 
processing deficits as biomarkers of vulnerability to schizophrenia: An event-related potential 
study in schizotypy. Neuropsychologia, 48, 2205–2214. 
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.04.014 
Koychev, I., McMullen, K., Lees, J., Dadhiwala, R., Grayson, L., Perry, C., . . .Barkus, E. 
(2012). A validation of cognitive biomarkers for the early identification of cognitive enhancing 
agents in schizotypy: A three-center double-blind placebo-controlled study. European 
Neuropsychopharmacology, 22, 469–481. 10.1016/j.euroneuro.2011.10.005 
Krawietz, S. A., Tamplin, A. K., & Radvansky, G. A. (2012). Aging and mind wandering during 
text comprehension. Psychology and Aging, 27, 951–958. 10.1037/a0028831 
Kreher, D. A., Holcomb, P. J., Goff, D., & Kuperberg, G. R. (2008). Neural evidence for faster 
and further automatic spreading activation in schizophrenic thought disorder. Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 34, 473–482. 10.1093/schbul/sbm108 
Kuntsi, J., & Klein, C. (2012). Intraindividual variability in ADHD and its implications for 
research of causal links. In C.Stanford & R.Tannock (Eds.), Behavioral neuroscience of attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder and its treatment: Current topics in behavioral 
neurosciences (Vol. 9, pp. 67–91). New York, NY: Springer. 
Kwapil, T. R. (1998). Social anhedonia as a predictor of the development of schizophrenia-
spectrum disorders. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 107, 558–565. 10.1037/0021-
843X.107.4.558 
Kwapil, T. R., & Barrantes-Vidal, N. (2015). Schizotypy: Looking back and moving 
forward. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 41(Suppl 2), S366–S373. 10.1093/schbul/sbu186 
Kwapil, T. R., Barrantes-Vidal, N., & Silvia, P. J. (2008). The dimensional structure of the 
Wisconsin Schizotypy Scales: Factor identification and construct validity. Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 34, 444–457. 10.1093/schbul/sbm098 
Kwapil, T. R., Brown, L. H., Silvia, P. J., Myin-Germeys, I., & Barrantes-Vidal, N. (2012). The 
expression of positive and negative schizotypy in daily life: An experience sampling 
study. Psychological Medicine, 42, 2555–2566. 10.1017/S0033291712000827 
Kwapil, T. R., & Chun, C. A. (2015). The psychometric assessment of schizotypy. In O.Mason 
& G.Claridge (Eds.), Schizotypy: New dimensions (pp. 7–32). London, UK: Routledge. 
Kwapil, T. R., Gross, G. M., Silvia, P. J., & Barrantes-Vidal, N. (2013). Prediction of 
psychopathology and functional impairment by positive and negative schizotypy in the 
Chapmans’ ten-year longitudinal study. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 122, 807–815. 
10.1037/a0033759 
Kwapil, T. R., Silvia, P. J., Myin-Germeys, I., Anderson, A. J., Coates, S. A., & Brown, L. H. 
(2009). The social world of the socially anhedonic: Exploring the daily ecology of 
asociality. Journal of Research in Personality, 43, 103–106. 10.1016/j.jrp.2008.10.008 
Kyllonen, P. C., & Christal, R. E. (1990). Reasoning ability is (little more than) working-
memory capacity?!Intelligence, 14, 389–433. 10.1016/S0160-2896(05)80012-1 
Larson, G. E., & Alderton, D. L. (1990). Reaction time variability and intelligence: A “worst 
performance” analysis of individual differences. Intelligence, 14, 309–325. 10.1016/0160-
2896(90)90021-K 
Lee, K., & Ashton, M. C. (2004). Psychometric properties of the HEXACO personality 
inventory. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 39, 329–358. 10.1207/s15327906mbr3902_8 
Lenzenweger, M. F. (2001). Reaction time slowing during high-load, sustained-attention task 
performance in relation to psychometrically identified schizotypy. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 110, 290–296. 10.1037/0021-843X.110.2.290 
Lenzenweger, M. F., Cornblatt, B. A., & Putnick, M. (1991). Schizotypy and sustained 
attention. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100, 84–89. 10.1037/0021-843X.100.1.84 
Lenzenweger, M. F., & Gold, J. M. (2000). Auditory working memory and verbal recall memory 
in schizotypy. Schizophrenia Research, 42, 101–110. 10.1016/S0920-9964(99)00121-8 
Levinson, D. B., Smallwood, J., & Davidson, R. J. (2012). The persistence of thought: Evidence 
for a role of working memory in the maintenance of task-unrelated thinking. Psychological 
Science, 23, 375–380. 10.1177/0956797611431465 
Lewandowsky, S., Oberauer, K., Yang, L.-X., & Ecker, U. K. H. (2010). A working memory test 
battery for MATLAB. Behavior Research Methods, 42, 571–585. 10.3758/BRM.42.2.571 
Li, S.-C., Lindenberger, U., Hommel, B., Aschersleben, G., Prinz, W., & Baltes, P. B. (2004). 
Transformations in the couplings among intellectual abilities and constituent cognitive processes 
across the life span. Psychological Science, 15, 155–163. 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.01503003.x 
Liddle, P. F. (1987). The symptoms of chronic schizophrenia: A re-examination of the positive-
negative dichotomy. British Journal of Psychiatry, 151, 145–151. 
Lipp, O. V., Siddle, D. A. T., & Arnold, S. L. (1994). Psychosis proneness in a non-clinical 
sample II: A multi-experimental study of “attentional malfunctioning.”Personality and 
Individual Differences, 17, 405–424. 10.1016/0191-8869(94)90287-9 
Little, T. D., Cunningham, W. A., Shahar, G., & Widaman, K. F. (2002). To parcel or not to 
parcel: Exploring the question, weighing the merits. Structural Equation Modeling, 9, 151–173. 
10.1207/S15328007SEM0902_1 
Livesley, W. J., & Jackson, D. N. (2009). Dimensional assessment of personality pathology—
Basic questionnaire (DAPP-BQ): Technical manual. Port Huron, MI: Sigma Assessment 
Systems, Inc. 
MacDonald, S. W. S., Nyberg, L., & Bäckman, L. (2006). Intra-individual variability in 
behavior: Links to brain structure, neurotransmission and neuronal activity. Trends in 
Neurosciences, 29, 474–480. 10.1016/j.tins.2006.06.011 
Martin, E. A., & Kerns, J. G. (2010). Social anhedonia associated with poor evaluative 
processing but not with poor cognitive control. Psychiatry Research, 178, 419–424. 
10.1016/j.psychres.2009.08.018 
Matheson, S., & Langdon, R. (2008). Schizotypal traits impact upon executive working memory 
and aspects of IQ. Psychiatry Research, 159, 207–214. 10.1016/j.psychres.2007.04.006 
Matthews, G., Coyle, K., & Craig, A. (1990). Multiple factors of cognitive failure and their 
relationships with stress vulnerability. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral 
Assessment, 12, 49–65. 10.1007/BF00960453 
McGorry, P. D., Yung, A. R., & Phillips, L. J. (2003). The “close-in” or ultra high-risk model: A 
safe and effective strategy for research and clinical intervention in prepsychotic mental 
disorder. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 29, 771–790. 10.1093/oxfordjournals.schbul.a007046 
McKnight, P. E., McKnight, K. M., Sidani, S., & Figueredo, A. J. (2007). Missing data: A gentle 
introduction. New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
McVay, J. C., & Kane, M. J. (2009). Conducting the train of thought: Working memory capacity, 
goal neglect, and mind wandering in an executive-control task. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 35, 196–204. 10.1037/a0014104 
McVay, J. C., & Kane, M. J. (2010). Does mind wandering reflect executive function or 
executive failure? Comment on Smallwood and Schooler (2006) and Watkins 
(2008). Psychological Bulletin, 136, 188–197. 10.1037/a0018298 
McVay, J. C., & Kane, M. J. (2012a). Drifting from slow to “D’oh!”: Working memory capacity 
and mind wandering predict extreme reaction times and executive control errors. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 38, 525–549. 10.1037/a0025896 
McVay, J. C., & Kane, M. J. (2012b). Why does working memory capacity predict variation in 
reading comprehension? On the influence of mind wandering and executive attention. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 141, 302–320. 10.1037/a0025250 
McVay, J. C., & Kane, M. J. (2013). Dispatching the wandering mind? Toward a laboratory 
method for cuing “spontaneous” off-task thought. Frontiers in Psychology, 4 (article 570). 
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00570 
McVay, J. C., Meier, M. E., Touron, D. R., & Kane, M. J. (2013). Aging ebbs the flow of 
thought: Adult age differences in mind wandering, executive control, and self-evaluation. Acta 
Psychologica, 142, 136–147. 10.1016/j.actpsy.2012.11.006 
Meehl, P. E. (1990). Toward an integrated theory of schizotaxia, schizotypy, and 
schizophrenia. Journal of Personality Disorders, 4, 1–99. 10.1521/pedi.1990.4.1.1 
Meier, M. E., & Kane, M. J. (2015). Carving executive control at its joints: Working memory 
capacity predicts stimulus-stimulus, but not stimulus-response, conflict. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41, 1849–1872. 10.1037/xlm0000147 
Miers, T. C., & Raulin, M. L. (1987). Cognitive slippage scale. In K.Corcoran & J.Fischer 
(Eds.), Measures for clinical practice: A sourcebook (pp. 125–127). New York, NY: Free Press. 
Miyake, A., & Friedman, N. P. (2012). The nature and organization of individual differences in 
executive functions: Four general conclusions. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21, 
8–14. 10.1177/0963721411429458 
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., & Wager, T. D. 
(2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to complex 
“Frontal Lobe” tasks: A latent variable analysis. Cognitive Psychology, 41, 49–100. 
10.1006/cogp.1999.0734 
Modinos, G., Mechelli, A., Ormel, J., Groenewold, N. A., Aleman, A., & McGuire, P. K. (2010). 
Schizotypy and brain structure: A voxel-based morphometry study. Psychological Medicine, 40, 
1423–1431. 10.1017/S0033291709991875 
Moritz, S., Andresen, B., Naber, D., Krausz, M., & Probsthein, E. (1999). Neuropsychological 
correlates of schizotypal disorganisation. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 4, 343–349. 
10.1080/135468099395873 
Moritz, S., Woodward, T. S., Küppers, D., Lausen, A., & Schickel, M. (2003). Increased 
automatic spreading of activation in thought-disordered schizophrenic patients. Schizophrenia 
Research, 59, 181–186. 10.1016/S0920-9964(01)00337-1 
Mrazek, M. D., Smallwood, J., Franklin, M. S., Chin, J. M., Baird, B., & Schooler, J. W. (2012). 
The role of mind-wandering in measurements of general aptitude. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 141, 788–798. 10.1037/a0027968 
Murtha, S., Cismaru, R., Waechter, R., & Chertkow, H. (2002). Increased variability 
accompanies frontal lobe damage in dementia. Journal of the International Neuropsychological 
Society, 8, 360–372. 10.1017/S1355617702813170 
Muthén, L. K., & Muthén, B. O. (2012). Mplus user’s guide (7th ed.). Los Angeles, CA: Author. 
Oberauer, K., Süß, H. M., Wilhelm, O., & Wittman, W. W. (2003). The multiple faces of 
working memory: Storage, processing, supervision, and coordination. Intelligence, 31, 167–193. 
10.1016/S0160-2896(02)00115-0 
Obiols, J. E., García-Domingo, M., de Trinchería, I., & Doménech, E. (1993). Psychometric 
schizotypy and sustained attention in young males. Personality and Individual Differences, 14, 
381–384. 10.1016/0191-8869(93)90138-S 
O’Driscoll, G. A., Lenzenweger, M. F., & Holzman, P. S. (1998). Antisaccades and smooth 
pursuit eye tracking and schizotypy. Archives of General Psychiatry, 55, 837–843. 
10.1001/archpsyc.55.9.837 
Otteson, J. M. (1995). Attention and information processing variables in hypothetically 
psychosis-prone collect students (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of North Texas, 
Denton, TX. 
Paap, K. R., & Greenberg, Z. I. (2013). There is no coherent evidence for a bilingual advantage 
in executive processing. Cognitive Psychology, 66, 232–258. 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2012.12.002 
Paap, K. R., Johnson, H. A., & Sawi, O. (2014). Are bilingual advantages dependent upon 
specific tasks or specific bilingual experiences?Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 26, 615–639. 
10.1080/20445911.2014.944914 
Paap, K. R., & Sawi, O. (2014). Bilingual advantages in executive functioning: Problems in 
convergent validity, discriminant validity, and the identification of the theoretical 
constructs. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 962. 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00962 
Palef, S. R. (1978). Judging pictorial and linguistic aspects of space. Memory & Cognition, 6, 
70–75. 10.3758/BF03197430 
Park, S., & Gooding, D. C. (2014). Working memory impairment as an endophenotypic marker 
of a schizophrenia diathesis. Schizophrenia Research: Cognition, 1, 127–136. 
10.1016/j.scog.2014.09.005 
Park, S., Holzman, P. S., & Lenzenweger, M. F. (1995). Individual differences in spatial working 
memory in relation to schizotypy. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 104, 355–363. 
Park, S., & McTigue, K. (1997). Working memory and the syndromes of schizotypal 
personality. Schizophrenia Research, 26, 213–220. 10.1016/S0920-9964(97)00051-0 
Peters, E. R., Pickering, A. D., & Hemsley, D. R. (1994). ‘Cognitive inhibition’ and positive 
symptomatology in schizotypy. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 33, 33–48. 
10.1111/j.2044-8260.1994.tb01092.x 
Peters, M. J. V., Smeets, T., Giesbrecht, T., Jelicic, M., & Merckelbach, H. (2007). Confusing 
action and imagination: Action source monitoring in individuals with schizotypal traits. Journal 
of Nervous and Mental Disease, 195, 752–757. 10.1097/NMD.0b013e318142cc02 
Poole, B. J., & Kane, M. J. (2009). Working-memory capacity predicts the executive control of 
visual search among distractors: The influences of sustained and selective attention. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A: Human Experimental Psychology, 62, 1430–
1454. 10.1080/17470210802479329 
Rabbitt, P., Osman, P., Moore, B., & Stollery, B. (2001). There are stable individual differences 
in performance variability, both from moment to moment and from day to day. The Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology A: Human Experimental Psychology, 54, 981–1003. 
10.1080/713756013 
Raine, A. (1991). The SPQ: A scale for the assessment of schizotypal personality based 
on DSM–III–R criteria. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 17, 555–564. 10.1093/schbul/17.4.555 
Randall, J. G., Oswald, F. L., & Beier, M. E. (2014). Mind-wandering, cognition, and 
performance: A theory-driven meta-analysis of attention regulation. Psychological Bulletin, 140, 
1411–1431. 10.1037/a0037428 
Ratcliff, R., Schmiedek, F., & McKoon, G. (2008). A diffusion model explanation of the worst 
performance rule for reaction time and IQ. Intelligence, 36, 10–17. 10.1016/j.intell.2006.12.002 
Rawlings, D., & Goldberg, M. (2001). Correlating a measure of sustained attention with a 
multidimensional measure of schizotypal traits. Personality and Individual Differences, 31, 421–
431. 10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00147-1 
Redick, T. S., Broadway, J. M., Meier, M. E., Kuriakose, P. S., Unsworth, N., Kane, M. J., & 
Engle, R. W. (2012). Measuring working memory capacity with automated complex span 
tasks. European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 28, 164–171. 10.1027/1015-
5759/a000123 
Rentrop, M., Rodewald, K., Roth, A., Simon, J., Walther, S., Fiedler, P., . . .Kaiser, S. (2010). 
Intra-individual variability in high-functioning patients with schizophrenia. Psychiatry 
Research, 178, 27–32. 10.1016/j.psychres.2010.04.009 
Rosen, V. M., & Engle, R. W. (1997). The role of working memory capacity in retrieval. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: General, 126, 211–227. 10.1037/0096-3445.126.3.211 
Rosen, V. M., & Engle, R. W. (1998). Working memory capacity and suppression. Journal of 
Memory and Language, 39, 418–436. 10.1006/jmla.1998.2590 
Rummel, J., & Boywitt, C. D. (2014). Controlling the stream of thought: Working memory 
capacity predicts adjustment of mind-wandering to situational demands. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 21, 1309–1315. 10.3758/s13423-013-0580-3 
Sahakyan, L., & Kwapil, T. R. (2015). Positive and negative schizotypy are associated with 
differential patterns of episodic memory impairment. Manuscript under review. 
Schermelleh-Engel, K., Moosbrugger, H., & Müller, H. (2003). Evaluating the fit of structural 
equation models: Tests of significance and descriptive goodness-of-fit measures. Methods of 
Psychological Research, 8, 23–74. 
Schmidt-Hansen, M., & Honey, R. C. (2009). Working memory and multidimensional 
schizotypy: Dissociable influences of the different dimensions. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 26, 
655–670. 10.1080/02643291003644501 
Schmiedek, F., Oberauer, K., Wilhelm, O., Süß, H. M., & Wittmann, W. W. (2007). Individual 
differences in components of reaction time distributions and their relations to working memory 
and intelligence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 136, 414–429. 10.1037/0096-
3445.136.3.414 
Schweizer, K., & Moosbrugger, H. (2004). Attention and working memory as predictors of 
intelligence. Intelligence, 32, 329–347. 10.1016/j.intell.2004.06.006 
Seli, P., Cheyne, J. A., & Smilek, D. (2013). Wandering minds and wavering rhythms: Linking 
mind wandering and behavioral variability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 39, 1–5. 10.1037/a0030954 
Seli, P., Cheyne, J. A., Xu, M., Purdon, C., & Smilek, D. (2015). Motivation, intentionality, and 
mind wandering: Implications for assessments of task-unrelated thought. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41, 1417–1425. 
10.1037/xlm0000116 
Shin, D.-J., Lee, T. Y., Jung, W. H., Kim, S. N., Jang, J. H., & Kwon, J. S. (2015). Away from 
home: The brain of the wandering mind as a model for schizophrenia. Schizophrenia 
Research, 165, 83–89. 10.1016/j.schres.2015.03.021 
Shin, Y. S., Kim, S. N., Shin, N. Y., Jung, W. H., Hur, J.-W., Byun, M. S., . . .Kwon, J. S. 
(2013). Increased intra-individual variability of cognitive processing in subjects at risk mental 
state and schizophrenia patients. PLoS ONE, 8, e78354. 10.1371/journal.pone.0078354 
Shipstead, Z., Harrison, T. L., & Engle, R. W. (2015). Working memory capacity and the scope 
and control of attention. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 77, 1863–1880. 
10.3758/s13414-015-0899-0 
Shipstead, Z., Lindsey, D. R., Marshall, R. L., & Engle, R. W. (2014). The mechanisms of 
working memory capacity: Primary memory, secondary memory, and attention control. Journal 
of Memory and Language, 72, 116–141. 10.1016/j.jml.2014.01.004 
Shute, V. J. (1991). Who is likely to acquire programming skills?Journal of Educational 
Computing Research, 7, 1–24. 10.2190/VQJD-T1YD-5WVB-RYPJ 
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2012). A 21 word solution. Dialogue: The 
Official Newsletter of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, 26, 4–7. 
Singer, J. L. (1966). Daydreaming: An introduction to the experimental study of inner 
experience. New York, NY: Random House. 
Smallwood, J. (2013). Distinguishing how from why the mind wanders: A process-occurrence 
framework for self-generated mental activity. Psychological Bulletin, 139, 519–535. 
10.1037/a0030010 
Smallwood, J., & Andrews-Hanna, J. (2013). Not all minds that wander are lost: The importance 
of a balanced perspective on the mind-wandering state. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 441. 
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00441 
Smallwood, J., Fitzgerald, A., Miles, L. K., & Phillips, L. H. (2009). Shifting moods, wandering 
minds: Negative moods lead the mind to wander. Emotion, 9, 271–276. 10.1037/a0014855 
Smallwood, J., O’Connor, R. C., Sudbery, M. V., & Obansawin, M. C. (2007). Mind-wandering 
and dysphoria. Cognition and Emotion, 21, 816–842. 
Smallwood, J., & Schooler, J. W. (2006). The restless mind. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 946–
958. 10.1037/0033-2909.132.6.946 
Smeekens, B. A., & Kane, M. J. (in press). Working memory capacity, mind wandering, and 
creative cognition: An individual-differences investigation into the benefits of controlled versus 
spontaneous thought. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts. 
Smith, E. A., Bolinskey, P. K., Guidi, J. P., Myers, K. R., Schuder, K. M., James, A. V., . . 
.Sheets, V. (2016). Further examination of the factor structure of the Chapman Psychosis 
Proneness Scales (CPPS). Psychiatry Research, 238, 257–263. 10.1016/j.psychres.2016.02.057 
Smith, N. T., & Lenzenweger, M. F. (2013). Increased stress responsivity in schizotypy leads to 
diminished spatial working memory performance. Personality Disorders, 4, 324–331. 
10.1037/per0000014 
Smyrnis, N., Avramopoulos, D., Evdokimidis, I., Stefanis, C. N., Tsekou, H., & Stefanis, N. C. 
(2007). Effect of schizotypy on cognitive performance and its tuning by COMT val158met 
genotype variations in a large population of young men. Biological Psychiatry, 61, 845–853. 
10.1016/j.biopsych.2006.07.019 
Spaulding, W., Garbin, C. P., & Dras, S. R. (1989). Cognitive abnormalities in schizophrenic 
patients and schizotypal college students. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 177, 717–728. 
10.1097/00005053-198912000-00002 
Steel, C., Hemsley, D. R., & Jones, S. (1996). ‘Cognitive inhibition’ and schizotypy as measured 
by the Oxford-Liverpool inventory of feelings and experiences. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 20, 769–773. 10.1016/0191-8869(96)00004-9 
Stefanis, N. C., Hanssen, M., Smirnis, N. K., Avramopoulos, D. A., Evdokimidis, I. K., Stefanis, 
C. N., . . .Van Os, J. (2002). Evidence that three dimensions of psychosis have a distribution in 
the general population. Psychological Medicine, 32, 347–358. 10.1017/S0033291701005141 
Styles, E. A., & Allport, D. A. (1986). Perceptual integration of identity, location and 
colour. Psychological Research, 48, 189–200. 10.1007/BF00309083 
Suhr, J. A. (1997). Executive functioning deficits in hypothetically psychosis-prone college 
students. Schizophrenia Research, 27, 29–35. 
Swerdlow, N. R., Filion, D., Geyer, M. A., & Braff, D. L. (1995). “Normal” personality 
correlates of sensorimotor, cognitive, and visuospatial gating. Biological Psychiatry, 37, 286–
299. 10.1016/0006-3223(94)00138-S 
Tallent, K. A., & Gooding, D. C. (1999). Working memory and Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
performance in schizotypic individuals: A replication and extension. Psychiatry Research, 89, 
161–170. 10.1016/S0165-1781(99)00101-8 
Tamm, L., Narad, M. E., Antonini, T. N., O’Brien, K. M., Hawk, L. W., Jr., & Epstein, J. N. 
(2012). Reaction time variability in ADHD: A review. Neurotherapeutics, 9, 500–508. 
10.1007/s13311-012-0138-5 
Tervo, K. E. (2004). Neuropsychological characteristics of putative schizotypes: A comparative 
study (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Maryland, College Park, MD. 
Thomson, D. R., Besner, D., & Smilek, D. (2015). A resource-control account of sustained 
attention: Evidence from mind-wandering and vigilance paradigms. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 10, 82–96. 10.1177/1745691614556681 
Unsworth, N. (2015). Consistency of attentional control as an important cognitive trait: A latent-
variable analysis. Intelligence, 49, 110–128. 10.1016/j.intell.2015.01.005 
Unsworth, N., Brewer, G. A., & Spillers, G. J. (2012). Variation in cognitive failures: An 
individual differences investigation of everyday attention and memory failures. Journal of 
Memory and Language, 67, 1–16. 10.1016/j.jml.2011.12.005 
Unsworth, N., Fukuda, K., Awh, E., & Vogel, E. K. (2014). Working memory and fluid 
intelligence: Capacity, attention control, and secondary memory retrieval. Cognitive 
Psychology, 71, 1–26. 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2014.01.003 
Unsworth, N., Heitz, R. P., Schrock, J. C., & Engle, R. W. (2005). An automated version of the 
operation span task. Behavior Research Methods, 37, 498–505. 10.3758/BF03192720 
Unsworth, N., & McMillan, B. D. (2013). Mind wandering and reading comprehension: 
Examining the roles of working memory capacity, interest, motivation, and topic 
experience. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 39, 832–
842. 10.1037/a0029669 
Unsworth, N., & McMillan, B. D. (2014). Similarities and differences between mind-wandering 
and external distraction: A latent variable analysis of lapses of attention and their relation to 
cognitive abilities. Acta Psychologica, 150, 14–25. 10.1016/j.actpsy.2014.04.001 
Unsworth, N., Miller, J. D., Lakey, C. E., Young, D. L., Meeks, J. T., Campbell, W. K., & 
Goodie, A. S. (2009). Exploring the relations among executive functions, fluid intelligence, and 
personality. Journal of Individual Differences, 30, 194–200. 10.1027/1614-0001.30.4.194 
Unsworth, N., Redick, T. S., Heitz, R. P., Broadway, J. M., & Engle, R. W. (2009). Complex 
working memory span tasks and higher-order cognition: A latent-variable analysis of the 
relationship between processing and storage. Memory, 17, 635–654. 
10.1080/09658210902998047 
Unsworth, N., Redick, T. S., Lakey, C. E., & Young, D. L. (2010). Lapses in sustained attention 
and their relation to executive control and fluid abilities: An individual differences 
investigation. Intelligence, 38, 111–122. 10.1016/j.intell.2009.08.002 
Unsworth, N., Redick, T. S., Spillers, G. J., & Brewer, G. A. (2012). Variation in working 
memory capacity and cognitive control: Goal maintenance and microadjustments of control. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A: Human Experimental Psychology, 65, 326–
355. 10.1080/17470218.2011.597865 
Unsworth, N., Schrock, J. C., & Engle, R. W. (2004). Working memory capacity and the 
antisaccade task: Individual differences in voluntary saccade control. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30, 1302–1321. 
Unsworth, N., & Spillers, G. (2010). Working memory capacity: Attention control, secondary 
memory, or both? A direct test of the dual-component model. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 62, 392–406. 10.1016/j.jml.2010.02.001 
Unsworth, N., Spillers, G. J., & Brewer, G. A. (2009). Examining the relations among working 
memory capacity, attention control, and fluid intelligence from a dual-component 
framework. Psychology Science, 51, 388–402. 
Vinogradov, S., Poole, J. H., Willis-Shore, J., Ober, B. A., & Shenaut, G. K. (1998). Slower and 
more variable reaction times in schizophrenia: What do they signify?Schizophrenia 
Research, 32, 183–190. 10.1016/S0920-9964(98)00043-7 
Wang, Y., Chan, R. C. K., Xin, Yu., Shi, C., Cui, J., & Deng, Y. (2008). Prospective memory 
deficits in subjects with schizophrenia spectrum disorders: A comparison study with 
schizophrenic subjects, psychometrically defined schizotypal subjects, and healthy 
controls. Schizophrenia Research, 106, 70–80. 10.1016/j.schres.2007.07.020 
Wilhelm, O., Witthöft, M., & Schipolowski, S. (2010). Self-reported cognitive failures: 
Competing measurement models and self-report correlates. Journal of Individual 
Differences, 31, 1–14. 10.1027/1614-0001/a000001 
Winterstein, B. P., Silvia, P. J., Kwapil, T. R., Kaufman, J. C., Reiter-Palmon, R., & Wigert, B. 
(2011). Brief assessment of schizotypy: Developing short forms of the Wisconsin Schizotypy 
Scales. Personality and Individual Differences, 51, 920–924. 10.1016/j.paid.2011.07.027 
Yon, V., Loas, G., & Monestès, J. L. (2009). Relationships between schizotypy and subjective 
experiences in a sample of 399 university students. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 50, 142–150. 
10.1016/j.comppsych.2008.07.001 
Young, S. E., Friedman, N. P., Miyake, A., Willcutt, E. G., Corley, R. P., Haberstick, B. C., & 
Hewitt, J. K. (2009). Behavioral disinhibition: Liability for externalizing spectrum disorders and 
its genetic and environmental relation to response inhibition across adolescence. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 118, 117–130. 10.1037/a0014657 
Yung, A. R., Phillips, L. J., McGorry, P. D., McFarlane, C. A., Francey, S., Harrigan, S., . . 
.Jackson, H. J. (1998). Prediction of psychosis: A step towards indicated prevention of 
schizophrenia. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 172, 14–20. 
Zalewski, C., Johnson-Selfridge, M. T., Ohriner, S., Zarrella, K., & Seltzer, J. C. (1998). A 
review of neuropsychological differences between paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenia 
patients. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 24, 127–145. 10.1093/oxfordjournals.schbul.a033305 
Zhiyan, T., & Singer, J. L. (1997). Daydreaming styles, emotionality and the big five personality 
dimensions. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 16, 399–414. 10.2190/ATEH-96EV-
EXYX-2ADB 
 
 
